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Abstract 
Given the overwhelming quantity of information available from the environment, 
how do young learners know what to attend to and learn about versus what to ignore? In 
my dissertation I propose that one mechanism for narrowing the learning space is for 
infants and children to use violations of prior expectations as special opportunities for 
learning.  
In Experiment Series 1, I showed 11-month-old infants events that violated core 
expectations about object behavior, or events that were nearly identical but did not violate 
expectations. I then taught infants new information about the object that participated in 
the event, and found that infants learned more effectively following surprising events 
than expected ones. Control experiments confirmed that this learning was not due to 
longer perceptual exposure to surprising events or to a general preference for objects that 
violated expectations, and that the learning enhancement only benefitted those objects 
that participated in the surprising event. 
In Experiment 2, I asked whether infants would preferentially seek information 
from and explanations for objects that behaved surprisingly. I again showed 11-month-
old infants perceptually matched surprising and expected events, and gave them the 
opportunity to explore the object from the event and a new object. Infants who witnessed 
the surprising event selectively explored the very object that violated their expectations, 
and more impressively, engaged in hypothesis testing behaviors that reflected the 
particular kind of violation seen. 
Finally, in Experiment Series 3 I asked whether this learning enhancement 
following surprising events is a more general feature of human learning. I examined 
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whether preschool-aged children in a museum setting would learn novel words more 
effectively following surprising than expected events. I found that, like infants, children 
showed enhanced learning following events that violated their expectations, and their 
learning was beneficially constrained to the entity that behaved surprisingly. 
Together, my experiments show that when infants and children witness an object 
defy their expectations, they learn about it better, explore it more, and seek explanations 
for that object’s behavior. Thus, early in life, expectancy violations offer a wedge into the 
problem of what to learn.  
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1. Introduction 
Human knowledge is remarkably sophisticated – from our technical knowledge of 
scientific instruments to our understanding of the social world. How does this rich body 
of knowledge emerge? Theorists have highlighted the importance of different aspects of 
the origins of knowledge in their views of development. On the one hand, some have 
proposed a rich starting state (e.g., Carey, 2009; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007; Spelke & 
Newport, 1998; Plato, 380 B.C.E/1892), which is often thought of as the product of 
evolutionary pressures that have come, over millions of years, to provide minds with an 
initial model of the world. The strength of such an initial model is that it can support 
strong predictions and guide behavior in the absence of specific experiences; yet it must 
manage to do so while still being flexible enough to acquire new knowledge. On the other 
hand, some thinkers have proposed a far sparser initial state accompanied by robust 
learning mechanisms (e.g., Skinner, 1977; Piaget, 1954; Helmholtz, 1867/1962). On this 
view, there is no initial model of the world (or only a simple perceptual one); instead our 
model of the world is built from experience, and learning requires forming associations 
between experiences. However, given that there is so much one could conceivably learn 
about the world, such learning must be constrained if it is to support rapid and accurate 
changes in knowledge and behavior. 
Historically, thinkers have stressed either the role of the initial state (see Fodor, 
1981 for an argument claiming that concepts must be innate and cannot be learned) or the 
role of learning (see Skinner, 1977 for an argument claiming that all experiences are 
associations between the body and the environment). Broadly, the goal of this dissertation 
is to explore the synergy between a rich initial state and learning. Throughout, the 
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research presented here aims to embrace both innate knowledge and learning to 
investigate the idea that infants and children might be empowered to scaffold novel 
learning from a rich starting state. In this way, innate knowledge might constrain the 
learning challenge faced by the developing mind. 
 
1.1. The importance of learning and its challenges 
Early associationist views posited that humans are equipped to form associations 
between stimuli, and that knowledge is the product of learning these associations. For 
example, Berkeley proposed that humans visually perceive depth not by automatic, 
unlearned mental computations over geometrical relations in the distal environment (as 
Descartes proposed, 1637/1971), but by associating the physical feeling of changes in the 
eyes with the haptically perceived distances of objects. Through these associations, he 
claimed that humans could eventually learn to perceive depth (1732/1910; see also 
Helmholtz, 1867/1962). Likewise, B.F. Skinner (1977) posited that human experience is 
shaped by contingencies between the body and environment, and denied the role of the 
mind and cognitive states. Theorists along these empiricist lines have proposed that 
humans are born with a cognitive architecture that is content-free and domain-general 
(Simpson, Carruthers, Laurence, & Stitch, 2005 for review). On this model-free view of 
learning, infants and children start with no expectations and thus have to construct a 
model of the world from thousands of sensory experiences (e.g., Piaget, 1954; Quine, 
1960; see also Locke, 1690/1975; James, 1890/1981).  
Indeed, young infants are adept learners. Fetuses and newborn infants recognize 
their mother’s voice and native language (e.g., DeCasper & Fifer, 1980; Kisilevsky et al., 
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2003; Moon, Cooper, & Fifer, 1993) and can learn to discriminate speech sounds while 
still in utero (e.g., Partanen et al., 2013; Moon, Lagercrantz, & Kuhl, 2013). Additionally, 
newborns and older infants can parse visual and auditory streams by learning associations 
between elements (e.g., Teinonen, Fellman, Näätänen, Alku, & Huotilainen, 2009; Bulf, 
Johnson, & Valenza, 2011; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Kirkham, Slemmer, & 
Johnson, 2002). Thus, accumulating experience is a powerful learning tool for even the 
youngest minds. 
However, the world is a complex and dynamic place; at any given moment, noisy, 
ambiguous information bombards the observer – indeed, too much information to encode 
and learn from at once. Consider even a simple case, one that seemingly skirts the 
problem by simplifying the input: an infant attempting to learn about a single object, like 
a cup. Despite the simplicity of this scene, there is a problem – the infant could perceive a 
finite array of perceptual data, but have an infinite variety of understandings of that data: 
she could learn about the cup’s shape, size, color, reflectivity, texture, sub-parts (and their 
corresponding shapes, sizes, colors, reflectivity, and textures), distance from the infant 
(or distance from any other entity), its velocity as it moves, and so on. Given this surfeit 
of potential cognitive descriptions, how does a thinker possibly know what to attend to, 
remember, and learn about? This problem may be particularly challenging for the 
youngest minds, those of infants and children, who arguably have the most learn, yet 
limited cognitive resources (e.g., Ruff & Capozzoli, 2003; Colombo, 2001; Rovee-Collier, 
1999; Ross-Sheahy, Oakes, & Luck, 2003). 
This problem – that learning is often highly underdetermined – has been noted by 
many previous theorists (e.g., Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011; Perfors, 
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Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Xu, 2011; Chomsky, 1980a; Chomsky, 1980b; Plato, 380 
B.C.E/1892; Pinker, 1994). Without a filter for determining what to learn, or a teacher to 
provide guidance (Csibra & Gergely, 2009), information overload can, in practice, make 
learning impossible. One might suggest that a strong empiricist and model-free view of 
learning (e.g., Piaget, 1954; Berkeley, 1732/1910; Skinner, 1977; Elman, Bates, & 
Johnson, 1996) puts learners in a nearly impossible predicament: they would not only 
need to accumulate thousands of hours of experience, but also determine which 
associations among those experiences are meaningful and which should be ignored.  
In addition to filtering out irrelevant information, learners often must make 
inferences over sparse data. For example, learning a grammar, acquiring new words, or 
constructing/enriching a concept requires that children go well beyond the immediate 
input, abstracting in powerful ways (Chomsky, 1980a; Chomsky, 1980b; Pinker, 1994; 
Tenenmbaum et al., 2011; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007; Spelke & Newport, 1998; Senghas, 
Kita, & Özyürek, 2004). The infant trying to learn about the cup in the example above 
might be successful in making an association between the word “cup” and the sight of the 
cup, but she must employ far more abstract knowledge to form a concept of cups such 
that she may appropriately extend the newly learned word to novel exemplars, and 
eventually use the word in an entirely new grammatical sentence.  
What is more, the empiricist perspective implies that there must be radical 
conceptual change across development from infancy to adulthood to achieve the mature 
knowledge state. Piaget (1954) famously suggested that infants and young children see 
the world in a radically different way than do adults. Yet, as Spelke and Newport (1998) 
point out, it might be more parsimonious to attribute infants with knowledge that is 
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shared with adults, such that less radical change is implicated. In fact, it might be this 
shared body of knowledge, present throughout the lifespan and developing in the absence 
of specific experience, that could offer a wedge into the hard problem of narrowing the 
learning space.  
 
1.2. The importance of core knowledge and its challenges  
One solution to the learning challenge might be for young minds to use prior 
knowledge (perhaps innate knowledge) to guide learning. This kind of model-based 
learning offers a filter for determining what to learn and what to ignore; if the young 
mind is already equipped with structured expectations, then learning could, in principle, 
be preferentially directed to cases when these expectations are not met – that is, to 
situations in which there is something new to learn.   
Before evaluating the plausibility of this idea, we might first ask whether there is 
in fact evidence for early structured knowledge such that it may be available to shape 
learning. A major challenge to answering this question has been methodological – how 
might it be possible to characterize the early knowledge state of the human mind? 
Although infants undoubtedly learn much about the world over the first year of life, some 
aspects of the world appear to be represented even prior to learning. These cognitive 
primitives, sometimes collectively called “core knowledge,” are thought to be the product 
of evolutionary pressures for organisms to solve domain-specific problems, particularly 
in the domains of objects, space, number, actions, and perhaps other minds (Spelke & 
Kinzler, 2007 for review). The solutions to these problems appear to be conserved over 
ontogeny and phylogeny. For example, evidence of core knowledge is observed in human 
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infants and adults (e.g., Huntley-Fenner, Carey, & Solimando, 2002; van Marle & Scholl, 
2003), and even newborn creatures show evidence of core knowledge (Izard, Sann, 
Spelke, & Sterri, 2009; Regolin & Vallortigara, 1995). Additionally, core knowledge has 
been observed in a variety of species, including non-human primates, rats, fish, and 
chicks (e.g., Hauser & Carey, 2003; Santos 2004; Santos & Hood, 2009; Spelke & Lee, 
2012; Regolin & Vallortigara, 1995). Core knowledge appears largely independent of 
specific experience, as it emerges under controlled rearing conditions (e.g., Chiandetti & 
Vallortigara, 2010) and across diverse cultures (Everett 2005; Gordon, 2004; Dehaene, 
Izard, Pica, & Spelke, 2006). 
The earliest and perhaps best-documented case of core knowledge is that of the 
“object concept.” Animals from a variety of species encounter and must reason about 
mid-sized, three-dimensional objects in their immediate environment. Expectations about 
the typical behavior of objects (i.e., recognition of the actions that objects can and cannot 
undergo) are likely to be beneficial throughout the lifespan. Indeed, early in the first year 
of life, human infants demonstrate sensitivity to principles of object behavior.  
Spelke (1990; 1994) has proposed that core knowledge of objects includes 
expectations about three central properties, each of which has been supported through 
empirical research with infants (and with some primates, for review see Santos & Hood, 
2009). One such principle is that objects cannot move without contact from other entities 
(e.g., Woodward, Phillips, & Spelke, 1993; Leslie & Keeble, 1987). For example, infants 
look longer when an individual object moves on its own accord, compared to when one 
moving object comes into contact with and launches another (e.g., Woodward et al., 
1993). 
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A second principle is that objects are cohesive entities that maintain their 
connectedness and boundaries (e.g., Kellman & Spelke, 1983; Spelke, Phillips, & 
Woodward, 1995; Spelke & Van de Walle, 1993). For instance, infants look longer when 
a hand grasps an object but only the top portion of the object lifts into the air, compared 
to when the entire object is lifted (Spelke, Breinlinger, Jacobson, & Phillips, 1993). 
Additionally, infants expect that a rod that moves behind an occluder is one cohesive 
object rather than two parts with a gap in between (Kellman & Spelke, 1983). 
A third well-studied principle of early object knowledge is continuity: objects 
move on continuous paths and continue to exist when out of sight (e.g., Spelke, 
Kestenbaum, Simons, & Wein, 1995; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; 
Baillargeon, 1987b; Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Baillargeon & Graber, 
1987; Wilcox, Nadel, & Rosser, 1996). In one study, 2.5-month-old infants saw a toy 
hidden behind one of two spatially separated opaque screens. When the screens were 
lifted, infants looked longer when the toy was revealed behind the other screen, compared 
to when it was revealed in its original hiding location (Wilcox et al., 1996). In another 
study, 5-month-old infants were shown a screen that rotated 180 degrees. A box was then 
placed out of view behind the screen, and the screen either rotated 180 degrees as before, 
or it only rotated 120 degrees as if it had been stopped by the box. Infants looked longer 
when the screen rotated the full 180 degrees, suggesting that they represented the box’s 
existence even though they had no perceptual contact with it (Baillargeon et al., 1985).  
In fact, infants maintain robust representations of hidden objects in the absence of 
perceptual input over a delay of several minutes (Luo, Baillargeon, Breukner, & 
Munakata, 2003), and infants can even represent the featural properties of hidden objects 
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(Baillargeon, 1987b; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991). For instance, Baillargeon (1987b) 
showed infants either a tall or a short object hidden behind a screen. The screen rotated 
backwards the same amount in both cases, but the rotation was only possible when the 
short object was behind the screen. Even though these two test events were perceptually 
identical, infants looked longer when the tall object had been placed behind the screen 
than when the short object had been placed behind the screen. This finding suggests that 
infants must have represented both the existence of the object and the property of its 
height.  
Recent evidence suggests that not only can domestic chicks represent objects 
through occlusion, but they, like infants, can represent featural information about hidden 
objects (Chiandetti & Vallortigara, 2010). Chicks were reared in an entirely controlled 
setting: each was alone in a cage with a singular object, a red cylinder, hanging in the 
center. Chicks imprinted on this object, as it was the only available mid-sized object in 
their environment. At test, chicks watched as the red cylinder moved toward two screens, 
at which point their view was covered by an occluder. The occluder was lifted to reveal, 
for example, one screen that was tilted backward 45 degrees, and one that was tilted 
backward 10 degrees (which would have been too flat to cover the cylinder). Chicks 
preferentially chose the screen that was tilted 45 degrees, indicating that they represented 
not only the existence of the cylinder, but its height as well. Chicks also successfully used 
height and width of the screens to reason about the location of the hidden cylinder, 
despite never having had experience with object occlusion (Chiandetti & Vallortigara, 
2010). 
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This last principle, that of object continuity, has some interesting corollaries. One 
corollary is that that no two objects can occupy the same space at the same time – in other 
words, infants appear to expect that one solid object cannot pass through another (e.g., 
Baillargeon, et al., 1985; Spelke et al., 1992; Baillargeon, 1986). Infants’ core knowledge 
of solidity has been demonstrated in numerous studies at various ages. For example, 2.5-
month-old infants show increased looking when a moving ball appears to pass through a 
wall, and 4-month-olds show increased looking when a falling ball appears to pass 
through a shelf (Spelke et al., 1992). Likewise, infants at 3.5, 4.5, 5 and 7 months look 
longer when a rotating screen appears to pass through an object placed behind the screen 
than when the screen is stopped in its path by the object (e.g., Baillargeon, 1987a; 
Baillargeon et al., 1985; Baillargeon, 1987b; Baillargeon, 1991). Six- and 8-month-olds 
look longer when a traveling toy car emerges from behind an occluder when a block had 
been placed in its path, compared to when the block was placed just behind but not 
impeding the path (Baillargeon, 1986). These results are consistent with the interpretation 
that infants maintained representations of both the barrier and the moving object during 
the occlusion, represented the moving object’s trajectory and anticipated that it would 
continue to travel on its path, and recognized that the object could not pass through the 
space occupied by a barrier. Notably, similar demonstrations of solidity knowledge have 
been observed in in toddlers (Mash, Clifton, & Berthier, 2002) rhesus monkeys (Santos & 
Hauser, 2002), and domesticated dogs (Kundey, De Los Reyes, Taglang, Baruch, & 
German, 2010). 
Together, these studies show that infants have sophisticated expectations about 
object behavior starting from early in infancy. One reason to think that this object 
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knowledge is not built from simple perceptual features is that it is specific to certain 
entities: namely, infants have expectations about mid-sized objects, but not non-cohesive 
substances. For instance, in one set of studies 8-month-old infants saw a rigid object, 
which was shaped like a pile and coated with sand, placed on a stage. Importantly, even 
though the object had a sand-like texture and color, it moved as a cohesive whole with 
stable boundaries. After this sand-object was placed on the stage, it was covered by a 
screen, and a second identical sand-object was added behind the screen. Infants looked 
longer when the screen was lifted and only a single sand-object was revealed than when 
two sand-objects were revealed, showing that infants successfully updated their 
representation of the hidden objects. However, when infants viewed an identical 
sequence of events but with actual sand poured onto the stage into piles, they failed to 
represent this non-cohesive substance and could not track it through occlusion: they 
showed no expectations about how many piles of sand should be behind the occluder 
(Huntley-Fenner et al., 2002). Other studies have demonstrated similar success with solid 
objects (e.g., Wynn, 1992) but failure with non-cohesive collections of objects (Chiang & 
Wynn, 2000). 
Additionally, the principles that govern the object concept are domain-specific –
they apply to mid-sized objects but not to all physical entities. For example, infants 
expect that objects cannot move without contact from other entities, but the same 
expectations do not hold for animate agents. Unlike inanimate objects, infants appear to 
understand that humans can indeed move on their own accord and do not require contact 
with another agent or entity to travel on a path (Woodward et al., 1993). Moreover, 
infants expect that social agents (e.g., humans with hands) can have goals and intentions, 
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but inanimate objects (e.g., rods, claws, and machine-like pincers) cannot (e.g., 
Woodward, 1998; Meltzoff, 1995). And 5-month-old infants expect that objects trace 
spatiotemporally continuous paths (Spelke et al., 1995), but do not appear to hold this 
expectation for people (Kuhlmeier, Bloom, & Wynn, 2004). 
The above evidence suggests that infants have domain-specific expectations about 
the behavior of objects that is available from the first few months of life, and that is 
shared with several non-human species – in other words, infants have core knowledge of 
objects. Like objects, other domains of core knowledge are also shared across 
development and across species. For example, infants, adults, and non-human animals 
share the core system of approximate number. Non-verbal number representations are 
noisy and abstract (i.e., not dependent on any one sensory modality), and support 
comparison and combination over represented quantities (Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 
2004 for review). Core knowledge of social agents allows humans and non-human 
animals to represent the goals, intentions, and mental states of animate agents (e.g., 
Woodward, 1998; Meltzoff, 1995; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Flombaum & Santos, 2005). Finally, research on the core domain of space demonstrates 
that, among other types of spatial representations, young humans, adults, and non-human 
animals reorient in space using the geometry of extended surfaces in the environment 
(e.g., Hermer & Spelke, 1996; Spelke & Lee, 2012; Dehaene et al., 2006), although this 
ability can be specifically impaired in some populations (Lakusta, Dessalegn & Landau, 
2010).  
Critically, positing core knowledge across these various domains does not deny 
the roles of change, development, or learning (Spelke & Newport, 1998; Spelke, 1998; 
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Baillargeon, 1999). The initial state of the mind cannot be static; rather, it must be 
responsive to experience and learning. Specifically, learning might be guided by domain-
specific constraints that are evolutionarily ancient (Gallistel, 1989). Thus, one might 
understand core knowledge as a learning theory – a starting model of the world that 
scaffolds future learning. For example, 3-month-old infants expect that an object should 
be stable when it is in full contact with a platform underneath it, and they expect the 
object to fall when it is pushed beyond the surface of the platform and has no contact 
with it (Needham & Baillargeon, 1993). However, it is not until 6.5 months that infants 
reason about how much contact the object must have with the platform to be supported 
(Baillargeon, Needhman, & DeVos, 1992). This suggests that while infants start with 
knowledge that an object must have some contact with a platform object to be supported, 
their reasoning about object support is refined over time. That is, infants’ initial state 
posits that contact is the relevant variable when reasoning about an object’s support (and 
not its color, for example), and they refine their theory by gathering evidence from 
relevant experiences with the world.  
Far from obviating the need for learning, core knowledge may be a foundational 
understanding from which learning begins. One way this could be so is if core knowledge 
offers a wedge into the hard problem of knowing what to learn. If a learner has a basic 
repertoire of core expectations about the world, then detecting a violation to these 
expectations – where what was predicted conflicts with what is observed – might signal a 
special opportunity for learning.  
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1.3. Uncovering infants’ knowledge 
A chief innovation in the effort to characterize preverbal knowledge, and in 
demonstrating the existence of the core knowledge domains reviewed above, was the 
discovery that a simple behavioral measure could be used to make inferences about 
infants’ mental lives. Because preverbal infants cannot use language to express their 
thoughts, researchers turned to a behavior that typically developing infants spontaneously 
produce nearly every waking moment: looking. Looking is a functional behavior – it 
helps to allocate attention and extract information from the world starting from birth 
(Fantz, 1964). Most of the earliest studies using looking time as a dependent measure 
sought to characterize infants’ perceptual abilities. Fantz (1964) examined visual 
exploration in newborns, and found that they can direct their gaze, discriminate between 
stimuli, and importantly, remember what they had seen. The habituation method has been 
one means by which developmental psychologists have determined infants’ perceptual 
abilities. Over the course of repeated exposure to a stimulus (e.g., a high contrast visual 
pattern), Fantz found that infants gradually decreased their looking time, indicating that 
they remembered some aspect of that stimulus. Following this period of habituation, 
when a novel stimulus (e.g., a new pattern) was shown, infants regained visual interest, 
demonstrating that they discriminated between this new stimulus and the one from 
habituation (Fantz, 1964). Other studies compared infants’ visual preference for one 
visual stimulus over another as a means to measure perceptual discrimination abilities 
(e.g., Fantz, 1963; Teller, 1979). 
More recent work using looking time has sought to make inferences about infants’ 
conceptual knowledge. The violation-of-expectation (VOE) method has been especially 
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fruitful in the search to uncover infants’ knowledge, and has been invaluable in the 
efforts to characterize core knowledge in particular. In this paradigm, infants often are 
habituated to a possible event, like a screen rotating forward and back 180 degrees on an 
empty stage, as described earlier (but for a design using VOE without familiarization, see 
Wang, Baillargeon, & Brueckner, 2004). Infants then see two new types of test events: 
one that adults would judge to be expected (e.g., the screen rotating only 120 degrees 
when a box is placed out of view behind the screen), and one that adults would judge to 
be surprising (the screen still rotating 180 degrees when a box is placed out of view 
behind it). In this example, infants systematically look longer at the outcome that adults 
judge as surprising, in which the screen appears to pass through a solid object. This 
pattern of longer looking to surprising events is quite general: across hundreds of 
published studies, infants look longer when basic expectations are violated, including 
expectations generated by core knowledge (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). For example, 
infants detect violations and look longer when a hidden object vanishes (Baillargeon et al., 
1985), when five objects added to five objects only yields five objects (McCrink & Wynn, 
2004), and when a social agent approaches someone who was previously mean rather 
than someone who was previously nice (Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003).  
Although the VOE method helped usher in a new way of thinking about early 
knowledge, some developmental psychologists voiced objections to using looking time to 
make claims about conceptual knowledge. One concern of looking time critics is that 
infants might learn about the stimuli over the course of habituation or familiarization. If 
infants repeatedly see a possible event during habituation, followed by two test events, 
one of which is possible (and is conceptually familiar but perceptually novel) and the 
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other impossible (and is perceptually familiar but conceptually novel), then perhaps 
infants learned over the course of the experimental session what is possible. On this 
account, infants’ elevated looking reveals sensitivity to the statistics of the experimental 
sequence, not abstract knowledge about object behavior. However, some studies did not 
involve habituation or familiarization phases in their design (e.g., Wynn, 1992; Wang et 
al., 2004), yet found that infants still looked longer at the impossible event. Another study 
demonstrated that infants familiarized to a possible event (object hidden in location A is 
retrieved from location A) looked longer at an impossible event (object hidden in location 
A is retrieved from location B), but not vice versa, indicating that infants could not be 
taught that an anomalous event was possible, at least over the course of a typical 
laboratory session (Newcombe, Sluzenski, & Huttenlocher, 2005). 
Another objection that has been raised focuses on the kinds of inferences that can 
be made from infants’ patterns of looking (e.g., Sirois & Marsechal, 2002; Jackson & 
Sirois, 2009; Haith, 1998). Aslin (2007) discusses the ambiguities of the looking-time 
measure, noting that longer looking at a stimulus could reflect various processes, 
including attention, surprise, orienting, novelty, and recognition. Haith (1998) and others 
have argued that the most parsimonious explanation of looking time data is that infants’ 
looking is guided by perceptual preferences rather than by conceptual knowledge. 
The well-studied case of object knowledge can help illustrate these issues. Infants’ 
longer looking at impossible outcomes, like one object appearing to pass through another, 
has been taken as evidence that infants represented the object once it was hidden, 
predicted that it would continue to exist and not pass through another object, and were 
surprised when these expectations were violated (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 1985). Haith 
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(1998) claims that the language used, including the terms represent, surprise, reason, 
infer, etc., are too strong and overestimate infants’ capabilities. These “psychological 
felonies” (Haith, 1998, pg. 168) cast doubt on the conceptual knowledge attributed to 
infants, and on the measure of looking time as a whole. Instead of interpreting infants’ 
longer looking to mean that infants were surprised by the conceptually novel outcome, 
these researchers claim that infants are looking at what became perceptually familiar over 
the course of habituation (Jackson & Sirois, 2009; Cohen & Marks, 2002).  
For example, Wynn (1992) and Huntley-Fenner et al. (2002) offered data to 
suggest that 5- to 8-month-old infants can maintain and mentally update representations 
of hidden objects. When infants see one solid object covered by a screen, and another 
added behind the screen, they look longer when one object is revealed compared to two 
objects. Cohen and Marks (2002) proposed that infants look longer to the “unexpected” 
outcome not because infants mentally represented both hidden objects, but rather because 
the “unexpected” outcome was more perceptually familiar – that is, the outcome that 
infants preferred was perceptually identical to the starting state of the display (containing 
just a single object) before occlusion and the second object was hidden. This account 
assumes no representational capacities on the part of the infant. However, the finding that 
infants fail to look longer at the unexpected (and perceptually familiar) outcome when 
non-cohesive entities (e.g., sand) are used suggests that mere perceptual familiarity 
cannot be driving infants’ performance (Huntley-Fenner et al., 2002; Chiang & Wynn, 
2000). Instead, the conceptual interpretation proposes that solid objects are privileged, 
such that infants can track them, represent them once hidden, update these representations, 
and ultimately look longer when their expectations are violated.  
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What is more, other methods and measures have converged on similar findings: 
for instance, infants have been shown to represent hidden objects in studies that measure 
looking (e.g., Wynn, 1992; Baillargeon, 1987b), reaching (Feigenson & Carey, 2003), 
and forced choice (Feigenson, Carey, & Hauser, 2002). In addition to these behaviors, 
surprising events can induce changes in social referencing behavior (Walden, Kim, 
McCoy, & Karass, 2007), facial expression (Camras et al., 2002), pupil dilation (Jackson 
& Sirois, 2009; Gredebäck &. Melinder, 2010), and brain activity (Wilcox, Bortfeld, 
Woods, Wruck, & Boas, 2005; Berger, Tzur, & Posner; 2006). From the behavioral to the 
physiological, these responses have been taken to indicate the detection of a discrepancy 
between what was expected and what was observed, and have been documented across 
domains of core knowledge.  
 
1.4 The role of prediction error in animal and adult learning 
Given the abundance of evidence that infants exhibit systematic behaviors 
correlated with surprising events (including longer looking), it is noteworthy that the 
purpose of these surprise responses remains entirely unknown. In particular, it is 
unknown what the cognitive consequences of experiencing an expectancy violation might 
be. One possibility is that surprise signals a special opportunity for learning: infants who 
see an event that violates their expectations might experience enhanced learning about the 
objects that behaved surprisingly. 
Although this hypothesis is untested in human infants, research with non-human 
animals suggests that violations of expectation can influence learning. In most of these 
studies, violation of expectation, or surprise, is operationalized as prediction error – a 
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quantifiable difference between what the animal expected to happen and what the animal 
actually observed. When prediction errors are large, the animal might modify its behavior 
to more successfully predict events in the future (i.e., to learn); when prediction errors are 
small or zero, little modification is necessary since events unfolded as predicted (Schultz 
& Dickinson, 2000; Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 2006). The highly influential Pearce 
Hall model of learning (Pearce & Hall, 1980) offers an account of this effect: it posits 
that an unexpected unconditioned stimulus increases an animal’s attention to, and thereby 
the associability of, a conditioned stimulus that accompanied that surprising event. 
Therefore, large prediction errors lead to faster learning.  
As an illustration, consider two groups of rats trained that the appearance of a 
light reliably predicts the receipt of a shock. At first, this pairing is unexpected and the 
rats’ prediction error is large, but after many trials, the rats experience almost no 
prediction error. Next, the light is paired with a new stimulus, an auditory tone. For one 
group of rats, the unconditioned stimulus of the shock remains exactly the same. For 
these rats, the tone acquires no associative strength because the light already perfectly 
predicts the shock (this phenomenon is known as “blocking”). A separate group of rats 
experience the compound stimulus of the light plus the tone, but now followed by a 
stronger shock or an additional shock, which is considered to be a “surprising” event. In 
this case, the unexpected unconditioned stimulus (the extra shock) elicits a large 
prediction error. Blocking to the tone does not occur; the tone signaled a change in the 
unconditioned stimulus (the surprising extra shock), and thus the rats learn about the 
conditioned stimulus that predicted that surprising event (e.g., Kamin, 1969; Pearce & 
Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Surprise can also be operationalized in other 
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ways; rather than receiving extra shock, rats can experience enhanced learning about the 
conditioned stimulus if the unconditioned stimulus is temporally delayed or altogether 
omitted (Dickinson, Hall, & Mackintosh, 1976), or if the conditioned stimulus 
surprisingly predicts a neutral stimulus (Wilson, Boumphrey, & Pearce, 1992). 
In addition to influencing rates of learning in rodents, prediction error has been 
shown to play a role in learning in non-human primates. Monkeys in a blocking 
experiment learned more effectively about a conditioned stimulus that surprisingly 
predicted a reward (Waeleti, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001). Many studies suggest that 
dopamine neurons code prediction errors, such that they show increased responses for 
unpredictable than predictable rewards, with these responses then decreasing with 
continued learning (e.g., Waeleti et al., 2001; Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; Schultz, 
Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Roesch, Esber, Li, Daw, & Schoenbaum, 2012 for review; 
Schultz & Dickson, 2000 for review). 
Additionally, monkeys are more likely to adjust their behavior following 
surprising than predictable events (Hayden, Heilbronner, Pearson, & Platt, 2011). When 
they receive an expected large reward, they are likely to maintain the same strategy to 
receive reward on the next trial. However, if monkeys receive a large reward that was 
surprising, they are more likely to switch their strategy, indicating that they may have 
interpreted the surprising event as indicating a change in the contingency between the 
reward and the conditioned stimulus. Thus, monkeys are more likely to explore new 
strategies rather than exploit a current one following surprising events. Furthermore, the 
neural basis for this effect has begun to be revealed – neurons in the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) increase in firing rate for these improbable rewards (Hayden et al., 2011).  
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Similar to the studies with non-human species, most research on the effects of 
surprise on learning in human adults have relied on teaching observers a probabilistic 
structure, violations of which can be detected as the observer learns the contingencies. 
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Fletcher et al., 2003; den Ouden, Friston, 
Daw, McIntosh, & Stephan, 2009), ACC (e.g., Carter et al., 1998; Brown & Braver, 
2005), and striatum (e.g., McClure, Berns, & Montague, 2003; den Ouden et al., 2009; 
O’Doherty et al., 2004; Hare, O’Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 2008) have been 
implicated in detecting conflict between what was expected and what was observed. 
Surprising events induce changes in activity in these areas in conditioning tasks in which 
a stimulus predicted reward (e.g., juice; McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2004), as 
well as incidental learning tasks in which stimuli had no intrinsic hedonic value (e.g., den 
Ouden et al., 2009; Wacongne et al., 2011).  
One experiment with human adults (den Ouden et al., 2009) presented observers 
with an incidental learning task in which they were to detect the presence of an auditory-
visual target among other auditory and visual stimuli. The auditory distractors predicted 
whether or not a visual distractor would appear. Observers exhibited increased activity in 
the DLPFC when the presence or absence of a visual target was expected compared to 
when it was surprising. Additionally, observers exhibited increased activity in primary 
visual cortex (V1) and striatum when an expected visual target was omitted or an 
unexpected target was present. These responses increased over time as learning improved, 
whereas responses to predicted stimuli decreased. Critically, a model showed that there 
was an increase in connectivity between primary auditory cortex (A1) and V1 for trials in 
which the presence or absence of a visual target was surprising (i.e., the auditory cue did 
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not accurately predict the visual target), which is taken as an index of learning. That is, 
increasing the connection between these two areas can help reduce future prediction 
errors and enhance subsequent learning (den Ouden et al., 2009). 
These studies on prediction error in non-human animals and in human adults 
measured expectations about statistical contingencies learned over the course of an 
experimental session. However, very few studies have investigated the consequence of 
violations of core principles akin to what infants typically see in VOE experiments. One 
fMRI study with human adults found increased activation in DLPFC and ACC during 
events that violated fundamental physical relations (e.g., a magician closes his hand over 
a scarf and reveals that the scarf has disappeared) compared to events that did not violate 
any predictions (e.g., the scarf is still in the magician’s hand), or events that were merely 
surprising due to their novelty (e.g., the magician puts the scarf in his mouth) (Parris, 
Kuhn, Mizon, Benattayallah, & Hodgson, 2009). Thus, it is possible to dissociate 
responses to impossible events from responses to novelty-related surprise. But it remains 
unknown whether these types of surprise reactions affect subsequent learning. 
 
1.5. Children use prior knowledge for learning 
Although the effect of violations of expectation on infants’ learning remains 
unknown, older children can use prior knowledge to guide what they learn and how they 
explore. When three- to five-year-old children viewed an impossible solidity event in 
which a rotating screen appeared to pass through a block (akin to Baillargeon et al., 1985), 
they described the event as “magical” upon first observation. They also produced 
observable reactions to the surprising event, including gasps and stares at the apparatus. 
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After repeated viewings, however, children appealed to concrete explanations for the 
surprising event (e.g., that the block was crushed) and spontaneously explored the 
apparatus (Chandler & Lalonde, 1994). 
A recent study asked how children’s prior knowledge state influences their 
explanations and explorations of belief-violating events (Bonawitz, van Schijndel, Friel, 
& Schulz, 2012). Children were shown an asymmetrical object and a post, and were 
asked how the object should balance. One group incorrectly believed that the object 
should balance on its geometric center (Center theorists); another group correctly 
believed that the object should instead balance on its center of mass (Mass theorists). 
Children then viewed one of two types of apparatus: one in which an asymmetrical object 
balanced on its geometric center, or one in which the object balanced on its center of 
mass. They were given a choice to play with that very same apparatus, or an entirely 
novel toy. Children who saw the object balance in a way that was consistent with their 
beliefs (i.e., Center theorists who saw the object balance on its center, and Mass theorists 
who saw the object balance on its center of mass) opted to explore the novel toy. But, 
children who saw the object balance in a way that was inconsistent with their beliefs (i.e., 
Center theorists who saw it balance on its center of mass, and Mass theorists who saw it 
balance on its geometric center) preferentially explored that very apparatus over the novel 
toy. Moreover, children who had experienced evidence that violated their beliefs were 
more likely to appeal to a hidden cause for the surprising event (e.g., to suggest that a 
magnet was present). This finding shows that children can use their prior beliefs to 
mediate their exploration and explanations. 
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Other studies have demonstrated that children can use beliefs constructed on-line 
in the experimental session to drive their exploration and explanations (e.g., Schulz & 
Bonawitz, 2007; Legare, Gelman, & Wellman, 2010; Legare, 2012; van Schijndel, Visser, 
van Bers, & Raijmakers, 2015). In one such study, children were shown a novel object 
that, when placed on a box, always made the box light up; a different novel toy was 
always shown not to make the box light up. After children learned the effect (or lack of 
effect) of both kinds of toys, they were shown each toy placed on a separate box, with 
neither box lighting up. When asked by the experimenter, “Why did this happen?” 
children overwhelmingly chose to offer explanations for the event that was inconsistent 
with their new knowledge (i.e., children tried to explain why the toy that should have 
made the box light up did not work) (Legare et al., 2010). Not only were children 
motivated to explain the inconsistent event over the consistent event, they were more 
likely to explore the toys in ways that reflected their explanations. For instance, children 
who explained the inconsistent event using statements that appealed to causal 
explanations, like the toy or its batteries being broken, were more likely to test multiple 
hypotheses about the object’s failure. For example, they attempted to open the object to 
investigate it, or combined the broken object with a functioning one (Legare, 2012). Thus, 
children tested hypotheses for their explanations of events that violated their expectations. 
However, it remains unknown whether much younger children – preverbal infants 
– also learn from and actively test hypotheses about events that violate prior knowledge.   
A plausible alternative is that verbal abilities, and prior experience receiving verbal 
explanations from adults, is necessary to spark this kind of inquiry. Still, there are a few 
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suggestive pieces of evidence that indeed infants might be motivated to learn from 
surprising events and/or test hypotheses for surprising events.  
The first piece of evidence comes from research showing that infants can employ 
their prior knowledge to appropriately reason about object support relations. Infants 
younger than 12.5 months fail to take into account the proportional distribution of an 
asymmetrical object to determine whether it is adequately supported by a box underneath 
it, such that it will remain stable and not fall (Baillargeon, 1999). If, however, these 
infants see contrastive examples that highlight the relevant variable, they can successfully 
use proportional distribution information to reason about the object’s behavior. Infants 
were shown two true examples: one in which the heavier half of an asymmetrical object 
rested on a box and the object did not fall, and one in which the lighter half of an 
asymmetrical object rested on the box and the object did fall. Following these teaching 
events, infants looked longer at surprising support events (i.e., at an asymmetrical object 
that should have fallen but did not) than non-surprising support events. Critically, infants 
who were taught with untrue events (i.e., in which the outcomes of the teaching events 
were reversed and defied principles of object support) did not successfully distinguish 
between adequate and inadequate support events at test (Baillargeon, 1999). These results 
suggest that infants integrated what they observed in the teaching events with their prior 
knowledge that unsupported objects should fall (e.g., Needham & Baillargeon, 1993) to 
learn to attend to the relevant variable of proportional distribution. 
But do infants actually seek explanations for events that violate their 
expectations? In one study, 3.5-month-old infants showed no evidence of surprise when a 
toy that traveled behind a U-shaped occluder did not appear in the gap as it should 
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(Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2002). But further investigation of the source of this failure 
suggested that infants may have been so committed to principles of object behavior that 
they generated an explanation for the surprising event: that there must have been two 
identical objects, one behind each leg of the U-shaped occluder. When infants were first 
shown that there was only one toy on the stage before it was hidden, they indeed were 
surprised when the toy did not appear in the gap (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2002).   
Moreover, older infants intervene on novel toys in ways that depend on the 
evidence they have seen (Gweon & Schulz, 2011). Sixteen-month-olds who saw an adult 
successfully activate a toy, but failed to activate that same toy themselves, turned to their 
parent to intervene rather than choose to play with another toy. But when infants 
observed an adult successfully activate a toy and then they were given a different toy that 
did not activate, they were more likely to choose another toy with which to play. These 
findings suggest that infants rationally generated an appropriate explanation for why the 
toy failed to activate. What is more, infants integrated probabilistic information to 
determine whether their failure to activate the toy was attributable to themselves or to the 
object: if one experimenter successfully activated a toy twice, and another experimenter 
failed twice, infants who received the same inactive toy opted to change the agent  (i.e., 
sought guidance from a parent) rather than the toy. But if infants saw two experimenters, 
each of whom succeeded in activating the toy once and failed once, they selectively 
changed the toy rather than seeking help from a parent. In both cases, infants saw only 
50% success of activating the toy, but in the former case they appeared to generate the 
explanation that one agent was competent at activating the toy and the other not, and 
therefore that their own failure must be attributable to themselves. In the latter case, both 
	   26 
agents only succeeded 50% of the time, and therefore the toy must have been unreliable. 
This study suggests that infants can draw inferences using observed evidence to 
determine how best to interact with the world when entities fail to behave as expected. 
The final piece of suggestive evidence that infants might be seeking explanations 
for surprising events comes from infants’ social referencing behaviors. Infants are more 
likely look to their caregiver’s face following events that violate expectations about 
object behavior than following events that accord with object behavior. It is possible that 
this increased social referencing behavior might reflect infants’ attempts to resolve any 
uncertainties or seek information from a knowledgeable source (Walden et al., 2007).  
Taken together, these experiments show that infants might be motivated to seek 
explanations for or information about events that are inconsistent with their expectations. 
However, no study has investigated whether learning is changed by having expectations 
violated. Here I tested the hypothesis that, early in life, violations of core expectations 
signal a special opportunity for learning. First I asked whether infants more effectively 
learn new information about objects that violated expectations than those that accorded 
with expectations (Experiments 1.1-1.3). Then I asked whether infants preferentially seek 
information from objects that violated expectations, and whether their exploratory actions 
test plausible explanations for an observed violation (Experiment 2). Finally, I asked 
whether surprise enhances learning in older children, outside of the controlled laboratory 
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2. Question 1: Does detecting an unexpected event enhance infants’ 
learning? 
Given that infants have sophisticated core knowledge about objects (e.g., 
Baillargeon et al., 1985; Spelke et al., 1992; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), I first asked 
whether they can harness this prior knowledge to guide subsequent learning. That is, I 
investigated whether witnessing a violation to core knowledge of object behavior 
enhanced infants’ learning about the entities that behaved surprisingly. In Experiments 
1.1-1.3 I showed infants an event whose outcome either was expected because it 
accorded with core knowledge of object behavior, or was surprising because it violated 
core knowledge, using events modeled on those in many previous studies (e.g., Spelke et 
al., 1992; Baillargeon, 1986; Wilcox et al., 1996). Then I taught infants something new 
about the object that had participated in the event, and, finally, measured how well they 
learned this new information.  
Three aspects of the design were crucial. First, I ensured that events that violated 
core knowledge differed minimally from events that accorded with core knowledge, by 
perceptually matching the events in all respects except for their outcomes. Second, I 
ensured that any observed learning enhancement was caused by experiencing a violation 
of core expectations, rather than by longer perceptual exposure to objects that violated 
expectations, by matching the duration of infants’ looking across outcome types. Third, I 
ensured that infants were learning something genuinely new by teaching them 
information that could not have been known beforehand, and that could not have been 
acquired just by seeing the objects themselves (i.e., I taught infants an object’s hidden 
property).  
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 Part of this chapter appears published as: “Stahl, A. E. & Feigenson, L. (2015). 
Observing the unexpected enhances infants’ learning and exploration. Science, 348, 91-
94.” 
 
2.1. Experiment 1.1 Infants’ learning following expected and unexpected events 
In Experiment 1.1, 11-month-old infants saw an event that either accorded with or 
violated object solidity or spatiotemporal continuity, two core physical principles to 
which young infants have consistently shown sensitivity (e.g., Baillargeon, 1986; Spelke 
et al., 1992; Spelke et al., 1995; Wilcox et al., 1996). Infants then had the opportunity to 
learn new information about the object in the event, that it had a hidden auditory property 
(e.g., it squeaked). They were subsequently assessed on how well they learned the 
mapping between the object and the sound. Two different kinds of physical events were 
used in order to demonstrate that any obtained results were not specific to any particular 
kind of physical violation (e.g., an object passing through a wall).  
 
Method 
Solidity Condition  
Participants. Twenty healthy full-term infants between 10.5 and 12 months old 
participated (range =10 months, 19 days to 11 months, 24 days; mean = 11 months, 7 
days; 12 females). Two additional infants were excluded for fussiness (1) or parental 
interference (1). Parents of all infants provided written informed consent prior to their 
participation. 
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Stimuli. Infants sat in a high chair in front of a stage; parents sat out of view. The 
stage (132 x 43 x 52.5 cm) had a concealed opening in its rear wall, a removable sloping 
ramp on its left side, and a track that ran across its width. A thin purple wall (1.5 x 28 x 
27 cm) stood at the right-end of the track and a thicker purple wall (3 x 28 x 27 cm) could 
be placed across the track’s path. A gray occluding screen (51 x 22 cm) was used to cover 
the right side of the stage during portions of the event; when the screen was in place, the 
purple wall(s) protruded 6 cm above it. A black curtain could be lowered to conceal the 
entire stage. 
The stimulus objects were a green, yellow, and orange plastic car (approximately 
17 x 13.5 cm) and a blue and red striped ball (7.5 cm diameter). For half of the infants the 
car was the target object and for the other half the ball was the target.  
Procedure 
 Familiarization. Infants saw two identical familiarization trials. The curtain was 
raised to reveal the ramp at the left of the stage and the thin purple wall at the far right. 
The experimenter reached down and placed the gray screen onstage, covering the stage’s 
right half. The top of the purple wall protruded above the screen. Next the experimenter 
reached in from above, holding the target object (e.g., car), and released it at the top of 
the ramp. The object rolled down the ramp, across the stage, and passed behind the 
occluding screen. Finally, the experimenter lifted the screen to reveal the object at the 
stage’s far right, where it had been stopped by the thin purple wall. The object remained 
there for 5 s, after which the curtain was lowered to cover the stage. 
 Solidity Event. Next, infants saw a single solidity event. The curtain was raised to 
reveal the ramp on the left and the thin purple wall on the far right. The experimenter 
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reached in from above and showed infants the thicker purple wall, twisting and knocking 
on it to show that it was solid before placing it across the center of the track. She then put 
the screen in place, covering the right half of the stage and hiding both walls except for 
their tops. The experimenter then said, “Look! Look at this! Watch this,” as she reached 
in with the target object (e.g., the car) and released it at the top of the ramp. The object 
rolled down the ramp, across the stage, and disappeared behind the screen. The 
experimenter then lifted the screen to reveal either that the object appeared to have been 
stopped by the thick wall and come to rest near the center of the stage, thereby according 
with expectations about solidity (Expected solidity event, n=10), or that the object 
appeared to have passed through the thick wall and come to rest at the far right side of the 
stage, thereby violating expectations about solidity (Violation solidity event, n=10) 
(Figure 1). Unlike previous studies designed to measure differences in infants’ looking to 
expected versus violation events, here I gave all infants the same limited visual exposure 
to the Expected and Violation outcomes; all infants had just 10 s to encode the event 
outcome.  
Teaching Event. After 10 s the experimenter demonstrated that the target object 
had a hidden auditory property. She grasped the object from its outcome position and 
moved it up and down rhythmically for 12 s while a sound (e.g., squeaking) played from 
a hidden central location (Figure 1). Half the infants were taught that the target object 
made a squeaking sound, and half were taught that it made a ringing sound; this was fully 
crossed with the target object’s identity (car versus ball). If infants looked away during 
these 12 s, the experimenter attracted infants’ attention and only resumed when they re-
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attended. After 12 s of exposure to the auditory property, the curtain was lowered to 
cover the stage. 
Test. Infants’ learning was assessed in a single test trial (Figure 1). The curtain 
was raised to reveal an empty stage. The experimenter reached down and simultaneously 
placed two objects on the stage 70 cm apart: the target object from the preceding event 
(e.g., car) and a new distractor object (e.g., ball). These rested silently for 5 s (Baseline). 
Then the experimenter grasped both objects and moved them up and down rhythmically 
while the same sound that had played during the Teaching Event played for 10 s from a 
hidden central location (Mapping Test). Whether the target object was on the left or right 
side was counterbalanced across infants.  
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Spatiotemporal Continuity Condition 
Participants. Twenty healthy full-term infants between 10.5 and 12 months old 
participated (range = 10 months, 15 days – 11 months, 26 days; mean = 10 months, 30 
days; 13 females). Four additional infants were excluded for sibling interference (1), 
inattentiveness (1), or experimenter error (2).  
Stimuli. Two identical black foam-core screens (27 x 29 cm) were used to hide 
the objects. Each had a concealed rear compartment that allowed the experimenter to 
surreptitiously add or remove objects from the stage.  
The stimulus objects were a green and red spotted ball (7.5 cm diameter) and a 
blue block with a schematic face (6 x 10 x 6 cm). For half the infants the ball was the 
target object and for the other half the block was the target.  
Procedure 
Familiarization. Infants saw two identical familiarization trials. The experimenter 
placed a screen in the center of the empty stage. She waved the target object (e.g., ball), 
then held it directly above the screen. She said, “Watch this!” and placed the object 
behind the screen. She immediately lifted the screen to reveal the object resting on the 
stage. After 5 s the curtain was lowered to cover the stage. 
 Continuity Event. Next, infants saw a single continuity event. The curtain was 
raised to reveal an empty stage. The experimenter placed the two identical screens on 
stage 27 cm apart, wiggling them to show that they were unconnected. She waved the 
target object in front of the left screen, saying, “Look! Look at this! Watch this,” then hid 
it behind the left screen. The experimenter then lifted both screens simultaneously to 
reveal either that the target object was still behind the left screen, thereby according with 
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expectations about continuity (Expected continuity event, n=10), or that it was now 
behind the right screen, thereby violating expectations about continuity (Violation 
continuity event, n=10) (Figure 2). Infants were given 10 s to look at the event outcome. 
Teaching Event. The Teaching Event was nearly identical to that following the 
Solidity events: after 10 s the experimenter grasped the target object from its outcome 
position and moved it up and down while a sound played from a hidden central location 
(Figure 2). Half the infants were taught that the target object made a squeaking sound, 
and half were taught that it made a rattling sound—this was fully crossed with the target 
object’s identity (ball versus block).  
Test. Infants saw the curtain raised to reveal an empty stage. The experimenter 
reached down and simultaneously placed two objects on stage 70 cm apart: the target 
object (e.g., ball) and a new distractor object (e.g., block). These rested silently for 5 s 
(Baseline). Then the experimenter grasped both objects and moved them up and down 
rhythmically while the same sound that had played during the Teaching Event played for 
10 s from a hidden central location (Mapping Test) (Figure 2). Whether the target object 
was on the left or right side was counterbalanced across infants.  
Infants’ looking was coded offline, frame-by-frame, by a trained observer who 
was blind to experimental condition. A second observer recoded 20% of all testing 
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Test trial. For each infant I calculated a learning score by subtracting the 
proportion of time infants looked at the target object relative to the new distractor object 
during the Baseline from the proportion they looked at the target object during the 
Mapping Test. If infants had successfully learned the object-sound mapping, they should 
increase the proportion of time they looked at the target object when the sound played – 
such auditory-visual “matching” is the pattern typically observed in studies of infants’ 
mapping abilities (e.g., Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1984).  
I found that infants’ learning of the object-sound mapping depended on whether 
they had just seen an Expected or Violation event. A univariate ANOVA with learning 
score as the dependent variable and event type (Solidity or Continuity) and outcome type 
(Expected or Violation) as fixed factors yielded only a significant main effect of outcome 
type, F(1,36)=10.691, P=0.002, partial η2=0.229. Infants’ learning scores were 
significantly greater following Violation than Expected events (Figure 4A). I then 
compared infants’ learning scores to chance (zero). I found that these were no different 
from chance following events that accorded with object Solidity (M=-0.10, SD=0.29), 
t(9)=-1.088, P=0.31, or Continuity (M=0.06, SD=0.12), t(9)=1.62, P=0.14. However, 
learning scores were significantly greater than chance following violations to both object 
Solidity (M=0.17, SD=0.18), t(9)=3.092, P=0.01, and Continuity (M=0.20, SD=0.17), 
t(9)=3.715, P=0.005 (Figure 4A).  
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infants from Experiment 1.1 looked longer to the correct object during the Mapping test 
simply because they had a preference for the object that violated their expectations, and 




Participants. Ten healthy full-term infants between 10.5 and 12 months old 
participated (range = 10 months, 26 days – 11 months, 24 days; mean = 11 months, 9 
days; 6 females). Three additional infants were excluded for fussiness (2) or experimenter 
error (1).  
Stimuli. The stimuli were identical to those in the Solidity condition of 
Experiment 1.1.  
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that in the Violation solidity event of 
Experiment 1.1, with one exception. During the Mapping Test, infants heard a novel 
sound. Half the infants were taught that the object made a squeaking sound during the 
Teaching Event, but heard a ringing sound during the Mapping Test, and half 
experienced the reverse.  
 
Spatiotemporal Continuity Condition  
Participants. Ten healthy full-term infants between 10.5 and 12 months old 
participated (range = 10 months, 18 days – 11 months, 28 days; mean = 11 months, 6 
days; 6 females). Three additional infants were excluded for inattentiveness (1) or 
experimenter error (2).  
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Stimuli. The stimuli were identical to those in the Continuity condition of 
Experiment 1.1.  
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that in the Violation continuity event of 
Experiment 1.1, with one exception. During the Mapping Test, infants heard a novel 
sound. Half the infants were taught that the object made a squeaking sound during the 
Teaching Event, but heard a rattling sound during the Mapping Test, and half 
experienced the reverse. 
 
Results 
A univariate ANOVA with learning score as the dependent variable and event 
type (Solidity or Continuity) and sound type (taught sound from the Violation conditions 
of Experiment 1.1 or novel sound from Experiment 1.2) as fixed factors yielded only a 
significant main effect of sound type. Infants’ learning scores were significantly greater 
when the taught sound played in the Mapping Test (Experiment 1.1) than when the novel 
sound played, F(1,36)=5.349, P=0.03, partial η2=0.129. When a novel sound was played 
during the Mapping Test, infants’ learning scores were not significantly above chance 
following violations to object Solidity (M=0.07; SD=0.15), t(9)=1.453, P=0.18, or 
Continuity (M=0.003, SD=0.29), t(9)=0.036, P=0.97 (Figure 4B). These results confirm 
that infants’ performance in Experiment 1.1 reflected successful learning of an object 
property, rather than heightened visual preference for an object that had violated 
expectations. 
Infants’ greater learning scores in the Violation conditions of Experiment 1.1 
cannot be attributed to those infants having had more perceptual exposure to the target 
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object (as compared to infants in Experiment 1.2). A univariate ANOVA with looking 
time to the event outcome as the dependent variable and event type (Solidity or 
Continuity) and sound type (taught sound from Experiment 1.1 or novel sound from 
Experiment 1.2) yielded a main effect of sound type, F(1,36)=4.452, P=0.042, η2=0.11. 
Infants in Experiment 1.2 (who heard the novel sound at test) looked longer following 
violations to object Solidity (M=6.79, SD=1.93) and Continuity (M=5.81, SD=2.93) than 
did infants in Experiment 1.1.  
 
2.3. Experiment 1.3 Infants’ learning about new objects following unexpected events 
 Finally, in Experiment 1.3, I asked whether violations of expectation enhance 
learning specifically about objects that violated expectations, or about anything following 
a violation. Infants who witness a surprising event might experience heightened attention 
or arousal that might enhance learning in a diffuse way. Alternatively, infants’ learning 
might be beneficially constrained to the very object that violated their expectations, and 
not to entities that are irrelevant to the observed violation.  
 
Method 
Participants. Ten healthy full-term infants between 10.5 and 12 months old 
participated (range = range = 10 months, 28 days – 12 months, 0 days; mean = 11 months, 
5 days; 5 females). Three additional infants were excluded for parental interference (1) or 
experimenter error (2).  
Stimuli. The stimuli were the ball and block from the Experiment 1.1 Continuity 
event and the car from the Experiment 1.1 Solidity event. 
	   42 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that in the Violation continuity event of 
Experiment 1.1, with two exceptions. After the Violation outcome was revealed (i.e., 
after the ball that had been hidden behind the left screen was revealed behind the right 
screen), the ball remained in place on the stage floor. After 10 s the experimenter reached 
in with a novel object (i.e., block) and moved it up and down rhythmically in the center 
of the stage for 12 s while either the squeaking or rattling sound played from a hidden 
central location (Teaching Event). As in the other experiments, the experimenter ensured 
that infants were attending to this object during the demonstration of the auditory 
property.  
During the Baseline, half the infants saw the block paired with the target object 
that had participated in the Continuity event (i.e., ball), and the other half saw the block 
paired with an entirely new distractor object (i.e., car) – these sat on stage silently for 5 s. 
After 5 s, the experimenter reached in and moved both objects up and down rhythmically 
while the sound that infants had heard during the Teaching Event (either squeaking or 
rattling) played from a hidden central location for 10 s (Mapping Test). Infants’ 
subsequent learning scores did not differ depending on whether the block was paired with 
the ball or the car (P=0.69). 
 
Results 
When infants were taught about a novel, unrelated object following a Violation 
continuity event, their learning scores did not differ from chance (M=0.005, SD=0.23), 
t(9)=0.074, P=0.94. Infants’ learning scores were significantly greater when they had 
been taught about the object that had violated their expectations (Experiment 1.1) than 
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when taught about an unrelated novel object (Experiment 1.3), t(18)=2.126, P=0.048 
(Figure 4C). Hence violations of expectation enhanced learning only for the object 
involved in the violation event, not for unrelated objects.  
Infants’ greater learning scores in the Violation conditions of Experiment 1.1 
cannot be attributed to those infants having had more perceptual exposure to the target 
object (as compared to infants in Experiment 1.3). An independent samples t-test found 
that infants’ looking to the Violation continuity event outcome in Experiment 1.3 
(M=3.45, SD=1.76) did not differ from that of Experiment 1.1, t(18)=1.0, P=0.33. 
 
2.4 General discussion of Experiments 1.1-1.3 
Experiment 1.1 showed that infants learn more effectively following events that 
violate their expectations than following events that accord with their expectations. 
Infants efficiently learned an objects’ hidden auditory property when that object violated 
the principles of object solidity or continuity, but failed to show any evidence of learning 
following a perceptually similar event that violated no expectations. Previous studies 
have shown that infants ranging from a few hours to 16 months old can learn associations 
between objects, sounds, locations, functions, words, and nonobvious properties (e.g., 
Morrongiello, Fenwick, & Chance, 1998; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; Perone & Oakes, 
2002; Werker, Cohen, Lloyd, Casasola, & Stager 1998; Welder & Graham, 2001). These 
previous studies taught infants arbitrary pairings over periods of repeated exposure. In 
contrast, infants in the present study robustly learned object-sound mappings in a single 
trial, with no habituation or familiarization – but only when taught about an object that 
had violated their expectations. Importantly, this learning enhancement was not observed 
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for one particular kind of physical violation. Infants showed elevated learning following 
violations to both solidity and spatiotemporal continuity. 
Experiment 1.2 ruled out the possibility that this enhanced learning might reflect 
increased interest in the object that behaved surprisingly, rather than actual learning about 
this object. When infants saw a surprising event and were taught that the object produced 
a particular sound (e.g., squeaking), they did not look at that object during the test when a 
novel sound (e.g., rattling) played, suggesting that they did not simply prefer to look at 
the object that surprised them. Instead, infants had apparently acquired genuinely new 
information about objects that violated their expectations.  
Finally, Experiment 1.3 demonstrated that infants’ enhanced learning is 
constrained. Infants did not show any evidence of learning about an irrelevant object that 
was presented immediately after a surprising event, indicating that enhanced learning 
following surprising events cannot be attributed to an overall increase in attention or 
arousal that would induce learning in a diffuse way. Infants’ failure to learn about this 
novel object shows that the learning enhancement observed in Experiment 1.1 also was 
not due to general novelty. When taught about an object that was completely perceptually 
novel (because it had never been seen before) but did not violate any expectations, infants 
showed no evidence of learning. 
 
3. Question 2: Do infants selectively explore and seek explanations 
about objects that behaved surprisingly? 
The finding that violations shaped infants’ learning in a targeted way, enhancing 
learning only about objects relevant to the observed violation, raises a further question 
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about the nature of the new information learned. In Experiment Series 1, the new 
information taught to infants was arbitrary in the sense that it did not clearly causally 
relate to the surprising violations (because the sound made by an object does not offer a 
direct explanation for its behavior). Besides enhancing learning for such arbitrary 
mappings (like those acquired by non-human animals; e.g., Pearce & Hall, 1980), do 
violations of expectation privilege the learning of particular kinds of information – ones 
that are relevant to the nature of the surprising event? When an observation conflicts with 
prior knowledge, an effective learning strategy would be to seek evidence that could 
explain the discrepancy between what was predicted and what was observed. Older 
children engage in this kind of hypothesis testing, performing targeted actions to support 
or rule out possible explanations for an event (Bonawitz et al., 2012; Legare, 2012). For 
example, when a toy does not behave as expected, children often offer an explanation 
(e.g., reporting that it is missing batteries) and test this hypothesis (e.g., by opening the 
object) (Legare, 2012). But it is unknown whether preverbal infants actively test 
hypotheses about events, especially events involving violations of core knowledge.  
 Part of this chapter appears published as: “Stahl, A. E. & Feigenson, L. (2015). 
Observing the unexpected enhances infants’ learning and exploration. Science, 348, 91-
94.” 
 
3.1. Experiment 2 Infants’ exploration following expected and unexpected events 
 Experiment 2 had two goals. The first goal was to ask whether infants 
preferentially seek information from (i.e., would prefer to play with and explore) an 
object that violated expectations over an object that did not. The second goal of 
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Experiment 2 was to ask whether infants actively seek explanations for the surprising 
events. Infants saw an event that either accorded with or violated the principles of object 
solidity or (extending my inquiry to another principle of object behavior) object support. 
Infants as young as 3 months old expect that an object should be supported when it is in 
full contact with a platform underneath it, and they expect the object to fall when it is 
pushed completely beyond the surface of the platform (Baillargeon et al., 1992; Needham 
& Baillargeon, 1993). Therefore, half of the infants in Experiment 2 saw a support event 
that either culminated in an expected outcome (target object remains fully supported by 
the surface underneath) or a violation outcome (target object loses contact with 
supporting surface, but fails to fall). 
 In Experiment 2, no properties were taught to infants following either the 
expected or surprising solidity and support events. Instead, immediately following the 
events the experimenter placed two objects on the infants’ high chair tray – the target 
object from the preceding expected or surprising event, and a novel distractor object. I 
asked which object infants would choose to play with, and what kind of exploratory 
actions they engaged in. If an observer sees an object violate solidity (i.e., a ball passes 
through a wall), an effective strategy to seek an explanation for this behavior would be to 
test its solidity by banging it on a solid surface. But if an observer sees a support violation 
(i.e., a ball floats in mid-air), an effective strategy to test its support would not be to bang 
the object, but rather to drop it. Here I examined whether infants’ exploratory actions 
tested hypotheses about the particular kind of violation seen.   
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Method 
Solidity Condition  
Participants. Twenty healthy full-term infants between 10.5 and 12 months old 
participated (range = 10 months, 15 days – 11 months, 28 days; mean = 11 months, 4 
days; 8 females). Nine additional infants were excluded for fussiness (2), parental 
interference (4), experimenter error (1), equipment failure (1), or refusal to engage with 
the objects (1).  
Stimuli. The stimuli were identical to those in the Solidity event of Experiment 
1.1. For half the infants the toy car was the target object, and for the other half the ball 
was the target.  
Procedure. The Familiarization and Solidity event were identical to those in 
Experiment 1.1. Half the infants saw the Expected solidity event, in which a ball or car 
rolled down a ramp and was revealed to have been stopped by a solid wall in its path. The 
other infants saw the Violation solidity event, in which the ball or car rolled down the 
ramp and was revealed to have apparently passed through the solid wall (Figure 5). 
Following the event, the target object remained visible in its revealed position for 10 s 
before the curtain was lowered over the stage. Infants were not taught any properties of 
the object. 
 Exploration Period. After the curtain was lowered, the experimenter emerged 
from behind the stage and placed two objects on either side of the infants’ high chair tray: 
the ball and the car (which of these had served as the target object from the preceding 
solidity event was counterbalanced across infants; Figure 5). Whether the target object 
was placed on the left or right side was also counterbalanced across infants. The 
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experimenter did not look at or engage infants while placing the objects; instead she 
immediately stepped out of view and gave infants 60 s to freely explore the two objects. 
If either object went out of infants’ reach (e.g., by falling on the floor), the experimenter 
immediately retrieved it and placed back it on the tray. No objects made any sound. 
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Support Condition  
Participants. Twenty healthy full-term infants between 10.5 and 12 months old 
participated (range = 10 months, 17 days – 12 months, 4 days; mean = 11 months, 7 days; 
7 females). Two additional infants were excluded for sleepiness (1) or parental 
interference (1).  
Stimuli. A white and gray horizontally striped box (33 x 20.5 x 10 cm) rested on 
the left side of the stage. The stimulus objects were the car and ball from the Solidity 
condition; which of these served as the target object was counterbalanced across infants.  
Procedure. 
The support condition was based on the procedure used by Needham and 
Baillargeon (1993). 
Familiarization. Infants saw two identical familiarization trials designed to 
familiarize infants with the target object and experimental apparatus. The curtain was 
raised to reveal the target object (e.g., car) resting on top of the striped box. The 
experimenter immediately reached into the stage and used her index finger to slowly push 
the object 8 cm to the center of the box, then removed her hand from the stage while 
leaving the object in place. After 5 s, the curtain was lowered over the stage. 
 Support Event. Next, infants saw a single support event. The curtain was raised to 
reveal the target object resting on the box. For infants who saw the Expected event, the 
experimenter said, “Look! Look at this! Watch this,” and then slowly pushed the object 
from the left side of the box 16 cm to the box’s edge, so that it remained completely 
supported by the box throughout. For infants who saw the Violation event, the target 
object started in the center of the box, and the experimenter slowly pushed it 16 cm, over 
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the box’s edge so that it no longer had any contact with the box and appeared to float in 
mid-air (Figure 6). Infants had 10 s to look at the event outcome (for infants in the 
Expected condition: the target object resting on the box’s surface; for infants in the 
Violation condition: the target object “floating” in mid-air). 
Exploration Period. The Exploration Period was exactly as in the Solidity 
condition (Figure 6). 
Coding. 
Exploration. Infants’ exploration was coded in terms of their looking and 
touching behaviors during the 60-second exploration period. Looking was coded as 
directed at the target object, the distractor object, or neither. Touching was coded as 
directed at the target object, the distractor object, both (because it was possible to hold an 
object in each hand), or neither. Infants were only coded as touching an object if contact 
with the object appeared to be intentional (e.g., an elbow grazing an object did not count). 
All exploratory behaviors were coded offline, frame-by-frame, by a trained observer who 
did not know whether infants had seen an Expected or Violation event, and who was 
unaware which object was the target. A second observer recoded all sessions and coder 
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Action Tendencies. Because details of infants’ exploratory behaviors might reveal 
an even richer interplay between knowledge and exploration, I also examined whether 
infants explored the target object qualitatively differently depending on which violation 
they had seen. I analyzed two common exploratory behaviors, each relevant to one of the 
presented events: banging an object (relevant to testing object solidity), and dropping an 
object onto the table or floor (relevant to testing object support). An action was coded as 
banging if infants intentionally brought an object into abrupt contact with any other 
surface (the tray, themselves, or the other object), or if they brought their hand into abrupt 
contact with the object. An action was coded as dropping if infants intentionally released 
an unsupported object onto the floor or onto the high chair tray, or if they intentionally 
pushed the object off the tray surface. An object accidentally falling off the tray (e.g., by 
rolling during play) did not qualify. An observer who did not know whether infants had 
seen an Expected or Violation event, and who was unaware which object was the target, 
coded all behaviors. A second observer recoded all sessions and coder agreement 
averaged 0.98 for banging and 0.98 for dropping. 
 
Results 
Event Outcome. Before examining exploratory behavior, I first analyzed infants’ 
looking times to the Solidity and Support event outcomes (Figure 7), prior to the 
Exploration Period, in order to ensure that any subsequent differences in infants’ 
exploratory behavior were not caused by differences in perceptual exposure to the target 
object following Expected versus Violation outcomes. In the solidity condition, infants 
looked for 4.37 s at the Expected event outcome (SD=2.12 s) and 4.41 s at the Violation 
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these behaviors into z-scores to empower their direct comparison. I calculated z-scores 
for each behavior separately, using the averages and standard deviations of banging 
(M=1.73, SD=2.61) and dropping (M=0.58, SD=1.26) performed on the target object by 
all infants. I then calculated an action tendency score by subtracting the z-scored 
frequency of infants’ object dropping from the z-scored frequency of their object banging. 
A univariate ANOVA with action tendency score as the dependent variable and event 
type (Solidity or Support) and outcome type (Expected or Violation) as fixed factors 
yielded a significant interaction between event type and outcome type, F(1,36)=9.43, 
P=0.004, partial η2=0.208. An independent samples t-test revealed that infants who had 
seen an object appear to pass through a wall (Violation solidity event) banged that object 
more than they dropped it (M=0.97, SD=1.57), relative to infants who had seen the same 
object stopped by the wall (Expected solidity event) (M=-0.29, SD=0.60), t(18)=2.378, 
P=0.029. In contrast, infants who had seen an object appear to hover in mid-air 
(Violation support event) did the reverse: they dropped the object more than they banged 
it (M=-1.05, SD=1.96), relative to infants who had seen the same object fully supported 
(Expected support event) (M=0.37, SD=0.96), t(18)=-2.045, P=0.056 (Figure 9).  
 

	   58 
solidity event (M=0.60, SD=1.52), or a Violation outcome of a support event (M=-0.51, 
SD=1.13).  
A repeated measures ANOVA with action tendency score as the dependent 
variable, object type (target or distractor) as the within-subjects factor, and event type 
(Solidity or Support) and outcome type (Expected or Violation) as between-subjects 
factors yielded a significant main effect of event type, F(1,36)=5.502, P=0.03, η2=0.133 
– overall, infants who saw a solidity event banged more, whereas infants who saw a 
support event dropped more. The analysis also yielded a significant interaction between 
event type and outcome type, F(1,36)=4.172, P=0.048, η2=0.104. Infants who saw the 
Expected events did not differentially engage with the objects. In contrast, infants who 
saw a solidity event end in a Violation outcome banged the objects more than they 
dropped them, whereas infants who saw a support event end in a Violation outcome 
dropped the objects more than they banged them. However, this interaction must be 
interpreted in light of the predicted significant interaction between object type, event type, 
and outcome type, F(1,36)=4.95, P=0.032, partial η2=0.12. The kinds of exploratory 
actions infants produced depended on whether they had seen a solidity or support event, 
whether they had seen an Expected or Violation outcome, and whether they were 
engaging with the target object or the new distractor object.  
 
3.2 General discussion of Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 showed that infants who witnessed a surprising event preferentially 
explored the object that behaved surprisingly over an entirely novel object that did not. 
The double dissociation in infants’ behavior – wherein infants who saw a solidity 
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violation tended to actively bang the target object, whereas infants who saw a support 
violation tended to drop it – shows that infants tailored their exploratory actions to the 
type of violation seen. Infants performed differential actions only following Violation 
events, and only on the objects that had committed the violation. Furthermore, the 
dissociation in infants’ actions on just the target object reveals two senses in which 
infants’ behaviors were highly directed: they focused on the entity that had violated 
expectations, and they were relevant to the nature of the observed violation. Thus, infants’ 
behaviors are not merely reflexive responses to the novelty of surprising outcomes, but 
instead reflect deeper attempts to learn about aspects of the world that failed to accord 
with expectations.  
In conjunction with Experiments Series 1, these experiments demonstrate that 
infants are motivated to learn about and seek explanations from entities that behaved 
surprisingly. The well-documented phenomenon of infants looking longer to surprising 
events may in fact reflect an underlying bias to seek information from entities that violate 
expectations. What is more, infants’ specific exploratory behaviors suggest that 
perceptual factors alone cannot explain their performance (as some have claimed; e.g., 
Cohen & Marks, 2002). This information-seeking behavior is arguably more 
sophisticated than the surprise-induced enhancement of learning acquired in studies with 
non-human animals, in which animals learned better about a conditioned stimulus 
following surprising events (e.g., Pearce & Hall, 1980). Here, the infants learned 
genuinely new information, and went well beyond the perceptual input to test specific 
hypotheses about specific kinds of surprising events. 
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4. Question 3: Do children learn more effectively following violation 
events? 
 Experiment Series 1 and 2 suggest that infants can use core knowledge to shape 
passive learning in which they acquired new information through observation, and active 
learning in which they initiated their own exploration and explanation-seeking from 
objects that behaved surprisingly. An important question is whether this phenomenon is 
limited to preverbal infant learners, or whether it is a general feature of human learning 
that occurs throughout the lifespan and in diverse environments.  
Previous research has shown that children are motivated to explore and explain 
evidence that is ambiguous or inconsistent with prior beliefs (Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007; 
Bonawitz et al., 2012; Legare et al., 2010; Legare, 2012; van Schijndel et al., 2015; 
Chandler & Lalonde, 1994) (see Section 1.5). But it remains an open question whether 
violations of core knowledge principles can guide learning of new information in young 
children.  
 I addressed this question by testing preschool-aged children outside of the 
controlled laboratory setting, here asking whether preschoolers also experience enhanced 
learning from surprising events in a more naturalistic learning environment, that of a 
children’s science museum. Rather than probing whether children learned arbitrary 
object-sound associations (as in Experiment Series 1), I asked whether surprise would 
affect children’s ability to learn novel words (that described either events that were novel 
but entirely possible, or similar events that were impossible in that they violated a 
principle of core object knowledge).  
	   61 
Children of this age are naturally engaged in learning new words, and can learn 
novel words in a single exposure (Carey & Bartlett, 1978). Nonetheless, children are 
variable in their vocabulary development (Fenson et al., 1994). The Intermodal 
Preferential Looking Paradigm has been instrumental in uncovering infants’ and 
children’s word comprehension (Golinkoff, Hirsh-Pasek, Cauley, & Gordon, 1987; 
Golinkoff, Ma, Song, & Hirsh-Pasek, 2013). Two images are presented side-by-side, and 
children hear accompanying linguistic information. Their comprehension is measured by 
whether they look to or point at the matching image. This method, as well as parental 
report, has shown that verbs in particular are more difficult to learn than nouns (e.g., 
Golinkoff, Jacquet, Hirsh-Pasek, & Nandakumar, 1996; Gentner, 1982; Bornstein et al., 
2004), as verbs are ephemeral, relational, and their meaning often relies on the syntactic 
structure of a sentence (Golinkoff & Hirsh-Pasek, 2008 for review). Children often 
require multiple exposures and contrastive examples to learn novel verbs (e.g., Waxman, 
Lidz, Braun, & Lavin, 2009). 
It is unknown whether witnessing surprising events would boost children’s word 
learning as it does for infants’ learning of hidden auditory properties. In Experiments 3.1-
3.4, I asked whether children learned more effectively following surprising events. All 
children were taught novel words that described expected and violation events, and were 
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4.1 Experiment 3.1 Children’s learning of novel verbs following expected and 
unexpected events 
I tested 3- to 6-year old children’s word learning in the dynamic setting of a busy 
science museum. All children saw two triads of events. The first two events in each triad 
were filler events that were novel but physically possible. Following each event, the 
novel action was labeled with a distinct novel verb. The last event in the triad, the critical 
event, was either expected or surprising on the basis of core knowledge of object 
behavior – it culminated in either an Expected or Violation outcome to spatiotemporal 
continuity (e.g., Wilcox et al., 1996). In this critical event, a toy was hidden under one of 
two cups, and was either revealed under the same cup after a spatial displacement 
(Expected outcome), or was magically revealed under the other cup (Violation outcome). 
The action in either of these events was labeled with a novel verb, and children were 
tested on whether they mapped the novel verb from the critical event to the correct object.  
The critical event in the other triad culminated in either an Expected or Violation 
outcome to featural continuity (Wilcox, 1999). A green doll was dropped into a bag, and 
an orange doll was removed either from a bag that already contained another doll 
(Expected outcome), or from a bag that was previously shown to be empty (Violation 
outcome). Again, children were taught a novel verb for the action in the critical event and 
were probed on whether they successfully learned this novel verb. 
All children saw one triad of events culminate in an Expected outcome, and one 
triad of events culminate in a Violation outcome. Unlike the between-subjects design in 
Experiment Series 1, this within-subjects design allowed me to ask whether within a 
given child, word learning was enhanced for surprising relative to expected events. Each 
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child had just a single opportunity to learn the novel verb, and a single test trial in which 
to demonstrate their knowledge. 
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-eight children between 3 and 6 years old participated (range = 
3 years, 1 month, 5 days – 6 years, 10 months, 6 days; mean = 4 years, 8 months, 3 days; 
19 females). Four additional children were excluded due to refusing to play the game (1) 
or experimenter error (3). All children in Experiments 3.1 to 3.4 were visitors to the 
Maryland Science Center and were invited to participate by a second experimenter who 
was greeting families on the museum floor.  Parents of all children provided written 
informed consent prior to children’s participation. 
Stimuli. Children sat in a small chair in front of a table with the experimenter 
sitting across from them.  
Spatiotemporal Continuity block. A black stage (46 x 15 x 30 cm) constructed out 
of wood sat on the table. The stage had two small circular trap doors that the 
experimenter could activate with hidden knobs. When the hidden knobs were turned, the 
trap doors allowed objects that were placed on top of them to be flipped out of view 
underneath the stage surface, and objects hidden underneath the stage (that were attached 
magnetically to the trap door’s surface) to be flipped up to become visible on the stage 
surface.  
A green clay wheel with a cross-hatched texture (4 cm diameter, 2 cm high) 
served as the acted upon object throughout this triad of events. Three distinctive pairs of 
opaque cups were used to perform the target actions: a pair of tall, thin red cups (9 cm 
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diameter, 15.5 cm high) with vertical stripes made of red ribbon; a pair of shiny orange 
cups (11.5 cm diameter, 7 cm high) with beveled edges; and a pair of wide blue bell-
shaped cups (14.5 cm diameter, 9 cm high) with a blue checkerboard pattern.  
Featural Continuity block. A green felt doll (7 x 13.5 cm) served as the acted 
upon object throughout this triad of events, and three other felt dolls (red, orange, and 
brown) were used just in the critical Expected and Violation events. Three distinctive 
containers were used to perform the target actions: a woven yellow basket (12 x 9 x 14 
cm) with a clear plastic container inside (6 x 7 x 6 cm); a translucent blue box (17 x 12 x 
3 cm) that contained a Velcro sticker; and a red velvet bag (12 cm diameter, 18.5 cm 
long) with a wooden handle. The bag was designed to be used in professional magic 
tricks because it had a secret compartment. Its main compartment could be accessed 
through the top opening or through a zippered opening at the bottom, but it also contained 
a hidden compartment that could only be accessed when the experimenter surreptitiously 
moved a lever underneath the handle. Moving the lever changed which compartment was 
accessible, so that an object placed in the bag could appear to vanish, or an empty bag 
could appear to suddenly contain something (both violations of continuity).  
Procedure. All children were tested in two test blocks. The first two events in each 
block were filler events that were always physically possible, but that were designed to 
be salient, novel, and to involve an action for which children did not have any existing 
verbal label. The last event in each test block, the critical event, was either physically 
possible (i.e., ended in an Expected outcome) or physically impossible (i.e., ended in a 
Violation outcome). Children were taught a novel verb after each of these events, and 
thus they had the opportunity to learn a total of six novel words over the course of the 
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experiment. They were tested on whether they learned the novel verb from the critical 
events. Half of the children saw the Spatiotemporal Continuity block culminate in a 
Violation outcome and the Featural Continuity block culminate in an Expected outcome, 
and the other half saw the reverse. Block order was counterbalanced across children. 
 Spatiotemporal Continuity Block  
 Filler Event 1. The experimenter said, “I’m going to put this toy right here,” and 
placed the green toy on the left side of the stage surface. She then held the two red cups 
out, one in each hand, so that children could see inside them. The left cup visibly 
contained a green cloth. The experimenter said, “See these? Do you see what’s in there? 
Watch this!” and lowered the cups facedown onto the stage, the left one covering the toy. 
She lifted the cups to reveal that the toy had been covered by the cloth, and then said, 
“Look what happened!” The experimenter pointed to the cups and said, “These daxed the 
toy!” She then cleared everything from the stage.  The covering of a toy with a cloth was 
designed to be possible, but novel. 
 Filler Event 2. The experimenter placed the same green toy on the right side of 
the stage surface. She held the two orange cups, one in each hand, so that children could 
see inside of them. The right cup visibly contained colored confetti. The experimenter 
said, “See these? Do you see what’s in there? Watch this!” and lowered the cups 
facedown onto the stage, the right one covering the toy. She lifted the cups to reveal that 
the toy had been covered with the confetti and said, “Look what happened!” The 
experimenter then pointed to the cups and said, “These fepped the toy!” She then cleared 
everything from the stage. The covering of a toy with confetti was designed to be 
possible, but novel. 
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 Event 3 (Critical Event). The experimenter placed the same green toy on the left 
side of the stage. She held the two blue cups out, one in each hand, so that children could 
see inside of them and could observe that both were empty. She said, “See these? Watch 
this!” and lowered the cups facedown onto the stage, the left one covering the toy.  
In the Expected outcome, the experimenter held both cups and, without lifting 
them, swapped their locations (as in a shell game). Thus, the cup that contained the toy 
was now on the right. The experimenter momentarily removed her hands from the cups, 
then lifted the cups to reveal that the toy was now on the right side of the stage. This 
outcome was considered expected, because children had seen the cups swap locations 
(Figure 10). As with the two filler events that had just occurred, this event was designed 
to be possible but novel. 
In the Violation outcome, the experimenter left the cups in their original resting 
locations and momentarily removed her hands from the cups. As she did this, she secretly 
turned the knobs behind the stage to activate the trap doors. This made the object under 
the cup in the original left-hand location flip out of view underneath the stage, and made 
the empty surface in the right-hand location flip upward so that a duplicate toy rested on 
the stage under the right cup. The experimenter then lifted the cups to reveal the toy on 
the right side of the stage, so that it appeared to have vanished from under the left cup 
and reappeared under the right cup (thus violating spatiotemporal continuity). Critically, 
the final outcomes of the Expected and Violation events were perceptually identical (the 
toy was revealed under the cup on the right), but expected in one case and surprising in 
the other. Immediately following either the Expected or Violation outcome, the 
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experimenter said, “Look what happened!” then pointed to the cups and said, “These 
blicked the toy!” She then cleared everything from the stage (Figure 10). 
 Test trial. Immediately following this third event, the experimenter brought out a 
tray holding one cup of each type (red, orange, blue), with spatial position 
counterbalanced across children. She always probed children’s learning of the verb that 
had been taught after the final, critical event by saying,  “If I wanted to blick the toy again, 
which one should I use? Which one will blick the toy?” (Figure 10). Children were 
prompted to point to the object that could be used to blick the toy. If children did not 
respond immediately, the experimenter repeated the question (e.g., “Which one will blick 
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Featural Continuity Block 
Filler Event 1. The experimenter showed children the yellow basket with the 
transparent container inside. She held the doll above the basket and said, “Watch this, I’m 
going to put him inside!” She shook the basket as she squeezed the doll so that it fit into 
the transparent container within the basket. The experimenter then removed the 
transparent container to reveal the doll compressed inside and said, “Look what 
happened!” She wiggled the basket and said, “This tizzed him!” She cleared everything 
from the table. The squeezing of a toy into a tight container was designed to be possible, 
but novel. 
Filler Event 2. The experimenter showed children the blue box with the Velcro 
sticker inside. She held the doll above the box and said, “Watch this, I’m going to put 
him inside!” She placed the doll in the box, closed the box and shook it, then removed the 
doll from the box to reveal that the Velcro sticker had stuck to the doll. She held up the 
doll and said, “Look what happened!” The experimenter wiggled the blue box and said, 
“This zavved him!” She cleared everything from the table.  The doll getting stuck to a 
shirt was designed to be possible, but novel. 
Event 3 (Critical Event). The experimenter brought out the red bag. In the 
Expected outcome, the experimenter first showed children that the bag was empty by 
unzipping it, sticking her arm through it, and looked through one side while children 
looked through the other. Once children agreed that the bag was empty, the experimenter 
zipped the bag closed. She then showed them the three dolls (red, orange, and brown) and 
placed them inside the bag, saying “Watch this, I’m going to put these inside!” She then 
said, “I’m going to take just these two out” as she removed the red and brown dolls, 
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showing them to children before placing them out of sight. She then said, “But there is 
still another one inside! Can you feel it?” and prompted children to feel the bulge in the 
bag where the remaining orange doll rested. She then held up the original green doll and 
told children that she was going to put that doll inside the bag. She dropped the doll in 
and shook the bag. Finally, the experimenter reached in and pulled the orange doll out. 
This outcome was considered expected, because children had previously seen the orange 
doll hidden in the bag and had never seen it removed (Figure 11). 
For children who saw the Violation outcome, an orange doll was secretly pre-
hidden in the bag’s secret compartment. The experimenter started by showing children 
three new felt dolls: one red, one orange, and one brown. She showed children as she 
placed them inside the bag, saying “Watch this, I’m going to put these inside!” She then 
prompted children to feel the bulge in the bag where the dolls were (this was done so as 
to match children’s experience with that in the Expected outcome). She said, “Now I’m 
going to take all of them out,” and removed all three dolls and showed them to children 
before placing them out of sight. The experimenter demonstrated that the bag was now 
completely empty, exactly as she did in the Expected outcome (by unzipping the bottom 
and prompting children to look through the apparently empty bag – note the orange doll 
was inside, but hidden in the secret compartment). She then held up the original green 
doll and told children that she was going to put it in the bag, dropped it inside and shook 
the bag. As she did this, she flipped the hidden lever on the bag’s handle so that the secret 
compartment containing the hidden orange doll became accessible. The experimenter 
reached into the bag and pulled the orange doll out, so that it appeared that the green doll 
had turned into the orange doll (a violation of featural continuity). As with the 
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Spatiotemporal Continuity event, the final outcome of the Expected and Violation events 
was identical: an orange doll was removed from the bag. Immediately following either 
the Expected or Violation outcome, the experimenter said, “Look what happened!” then 
wiggled the bag and said, “This moxed him!” (Figure 11). 
Test trial. Immediately following this third critical event, the experimenter 
brought out a tray holding one container of each type (yellow basket, blue box, red bag). 
She always probed children’s learning of the verb that had been taught after the final, 
critical event by saying, “If I wanted to mox him again, which one should I use? Which 
one will mox him?” (Figure 11). 
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Results 
The goal of Experiment 3.1 was not to compare children’s learning of the verb 
taught after the critical event to learning of the verbs taught after the filler events. Rather, 
the design of Experiment 3.1 allowed me to compare learning across children following 
two nearly identical versions of a single event: learning following an event that ended in 
an Expected outcome, versus learning following the same event that ended in a Violation 
outcome. The proportion of children’s correct responses at Test was compared to chance 
(0.33, as there were three objects to chose from on each test trial) using a binomial test.  
I found that children who had been taught a verb for an action that culminated in 
an Expected outcome chose at chance for both spatiotemporal continuity events (6 out of 
17 children, 0.35, P=0.51) and featural continuity events (7 out of 21 children, 0.33, 
P=0.57).  In contrast, children who had been taught the same verb for a nearly identical 
action that culminated in a Violation outcome exhibited robust learning; they chose the 
correct object at above chance levels following violations to spatiotemporal continuity 
(12 out of 21 children, 0.57, P=0.02) and featural continuity (14 out of 17 children, 0.82, 
P<0.001) (Figure 12). 
I directly compared children’s verb learning following surprising and expected 
events using a McNemar test (two-tailed, uncorrected). More children answered correctly 
following a Violation outcome and answered incorrectly following an Expected outcome 
than the reverse (14 vs. 1), X2(1)=11.27, P<0.001. Thus, children’s learning of novel 
verbs was enhanced following surprise. 
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Method 
Participants. Fifty-four children between 3 and 6 years old participated (range = 3 
years, 7 days – 6 years, 10 months, 10 days; mean = 5 years, 24 days; 27 females). 
Sixteen additional children were excluded for refusing to play the game (5), experimenter 
error (1), inattentiveness (6), parental/sibling interference (2), watching another child 
participate prior to testing (1), or missing birth date information (1). 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 3.1 with one 
exception. Instead of labeling each of the three events in each test block with novel verbs, 
the experimenter labeled the target objects with novel nouns. That is, instead of saying 
that the cups in the Spatiotemporal Continuity block had daxed/ fepped/ blicked the toy, 
she labeled the cups as daxers/ feppers/ blickers. For example, after the critical third 
event in the Spatiotemporal Continuity block, the experimenter pointed to the pair of blue 
cups (that had either been seen to move the toy from one position to the other by tracing a 
spatiotemporally continuous path, as in a shell game, or that had been seen to magically 
“teleport” the toy from one location to the other) and said, “These are blickers!” Similarly, 
instead of telling children that the containers in the Featural Continuity block had tizzed/ 
zavved/ moxed the doll, the experimenter labeled each container as a tizzer/ zavver/ moxer 
(e.g., “This is a moxer!”). In the test trial, she asked, “If I wanted to play with the blicker/ 
moxer again, which one should I use? Which one is the blicker/ moxer?” 
 
Results 
As in Experiment 3.1, I compared children’s learning following the critical 
Expected and Violation outcomes. I found that children who were taught the novel noun 
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4.3 Experiment 3.3 Ruling out perceptual preference for surprising objects 
One alternative explanation of the results of Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 is that 
children selected the correct object at above chance levels following Violation events 
because they simply preferred that object over the distractor objects from the filler events. 
The results of Experiment 1.2 showed that 11-month-old infants successfully learned new 
information about an object that behaved surprisingly, and did not merely have a 
preference to look at that object – if the preschool-aged children in Experiments 3.1 and 
3.2 also detected the violations of spatiotemporal and featural continuity (as the results of 
those experiments suggest they did), children might have pointed to objects that 
committed violations not because they learned novel verbs (e.g., which one could blick 
the toy) and novel nouns (e.g., which one is a blicker), but because they want to further 
explore objects that behaved in surprising ways. Experiment 3.3 was designed to test this 
possibility. Children saw the same series of events and learned novel verbs just as in 
Experiment 3.1. But this time, instead of probing children’s learning of the novel verb 
taught following the critical event, I probed their learning of a word taught after one of 
the filler events (which was always novel but physically possible). If children’s 
performance in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 reflected attraction to surprising objects rather 
than actual learning, then here in Experiment 3.3 they should erroneously pick the object 
that had participated in a violation event. 
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-four children between 3 and 6 years old participated (range = 
3 years, 28 days – 6 years, 10 months, 21 days; mean = 5 years, 2 months, 5 days; 11 
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females). Seven additional children were excluded for refusal to play (2), experimenter 
error (3), watching another child participate prior to testing (1), or missing birth date 
information (1). 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of the Experiment 3.1, with one 
exception. During the test trial, the experimenter asked children about the word that had 
been taught following the second filler event in each test block (which was always 
physically possible). In the Spatiotemporal Continuity block, this corresponded to the 
orange cups that had covered the toy with confetti. The experimenter said, “If I wanted to 
fep the toy again, which one should I use? Which one will fep the toy?” In the Featural 
Continuity block, this corresponded to the blue box in which the doll had become stuck to 
a Velcro sticker. The experimenter said, “If I wanted to zav him again, which one should 
I use? Which one will zav him?” 
 
Results 
If children were simply drawn to an object that had violated their expectations, 
they should again choose the third object from the critical Violation outcome in the test 
trial at above chance levels. However, I found that children who were asked for the object 
from the second filler event did not select the object from the third, critical event at above 
chance levels following either a Violation to spatiotemporal continuity (4 out 18 children, 
0.22, P=0.89) or featural continuity (8 out of 16 children, 0.50, P=0.12). Likewise, 
children did not select this object following the Expected outcome to spatiotemporal 
continuity (5 out of 16 childre, 0.31, P=0.65) or featural continuity (7 out of 18 children, 
0.39, P=0.38) (Figure 14). Equal numbers of children chose this third object following a 
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objects with novel nouns, and measured whether children learned words for the bystander 
objects present for Violation events more effectively than those present for Expected 
events. If surprise enhances learning for any entity that was present during a Violation 
event (perhaps due to increased attention or arousal), children should learn novel words 
for the bystander objects better following Violation events than Expected events. On the 
other hand, if surprise only enhances learning for objects that are relevant to the violation 
(as in Experiment 1.3 with infants), then children should fail to learn the novel labels for 
these bystander objects. 
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-eight children between 3 and 6 years old participated (range = 
3 years, 1 month, 27 days – 6 years, 7 months, 14 days; mean = 4 years, 9 months, 6 
days; 14 females). Eleven additional children were excluded for refusal to play (2), 
experimenter error (3), inattentiveness (4), or missing birth date information (2). 
Stimuli. The same stimuli were used as in Experiment 3.2. Three additional 
unique novel objects were used in the Spatiotemporal Continuity block (metal drain-like 
objects around 8 cm) (Figure 15A), and three additional unique novel objects were used 
in the Featural Continuity block (plastic, plug-like objects around 15 cm) (Figure 15B). 
These novel objects were chosen to be entirely novel to children, and also to be visually 
distinctive from one another but to share some perceptual properties (as did the cups in 
the Spatiotemporal Continuity block and the containers in the Featural Continuity block).  
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“If I wanted to play with the blicker/ moxer again, which one should I use? Which one is 
the blicker/ moxer?”). 
 
Results 
Children did not learn the word for the bystander object following Expected 
outcomes to spatiotemporal continuity (9 out of 19 children, 0.47, P=0.14) or featural 
continuity (7 out of 19 children, 0.37, P=0.44). Similarly, children failed to learn the 
word for the bystander objects following Violations to spatiotemporal continuity (10 out 
of 19 children, 0.53, P=0.06) and featural continuity (8 out of 19 children, 0.42, P=0.27) 
(Figure 16). Most critically, children were equally likely to answer correctly when the 
bystander object had been labeled following a Violation outcome and incorrectly 
following an Expected outcome as the reverse (7 vs. 5), X2(1)=0.33, P=0.56. Therefore, 
surprise appears to enhance learning in a targeted way: children’s learning was enhanced 
for objects and actions directly relevant to the surprising event, and not for irrelevant 
objects. 
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word that did not label the surprising action, children selected that object from the 
surprising events at chance levels. 
Finally, Experiment 3.4 demonstrated that children showed no learning 
enhancement for objects that were not involved in the violation event, much like infants 
in Experiment 1.3. Interestingly, these “innocent bystander” objects were present for the 
entirety of the event, and could have conceivably been related to the surprising outcome. 
Nonetheless, children failed to learn the novel nouns that described these irrelevant 
objects following surprising events, indicating that they focused their learning on the 
particular entities that were relevant to the surprising actions. Together, Experiments 3.1-
3.4 suggest that the surprise-induced enhancement of learning is perhaps a more general 
learning phenomenon that extends throughout the lifespan beyond infancy, outside of the 
controlled laboratory setting. 
 
5. General Discussion 
The last several decades of research have uncovered that infants have knowledge 
that is far more sophisticated than was once thought, and that at least some components 
of that knowledge are likely to be innate, in that they do not depend on specific 
experience (e.g., Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). The primary behavioral pattern used as 
evidence for this early “core” knowledge has been infants’ longer looking at surprising 
than expected events. The aim of my dissertation was to go beyond characterizing core 
knowledge, and to ask how this knowledge might empower further learning. In 
Experiment Series 1, I found that infants harnessed their core knowledge of objects to 
guide their learning. Specifically, I showed that 11-month-old infants learned new 
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information about an object better if that object defied their expectations about object 
behavior (i.e., by violating principles of solidity or spatiotemporal continuity). 
Importantly, these differences in learning cannot be attributed to increased perceptual 
experience with objects in surprising outcomes. My experiments were designed such that 
infants did not have the opportunity to look longer at the outcomes of violation events, 
and yet they still learned better about objects that behaved surprisingly, indicating that 
longer looking and enhanced learning are independent consequences of experiencing 
surprising events. 
In Experiment 2, I demonstrated that core knowledge not only enhances new 
learning, but it also scaffolds infants’ self-guided exploratory behavior. Infants 
selectively explored an object that violated their expectations over an entirely novel 
object that had not, and explored that object in particular ways that suggested they were 
seeking an explanation for its strange behavior. Infants produced actions consistent with 
the view that they were testing hypotheses for specific kinds of surprising events: infants 
who saw an object pass through a wall appeared to test the object’s solidity by banging it; 
in contrast, infants who saw an object float in mid-air appeared to test the object’s means 
of support by dropping it. Thus, the kinds of surprising events infants observed 
modulated their exploratory behaviors. 
Finally, in Experiment Series 3 I showed that this learning enhancement following 
surprising events is likely to be a general feature of human learning, at least during 
childhood. Three- to six-year-old children learned novel words more effectively for 
actions and objects involved in surprising events than expected events, and did so in a 
busy, naturalistic learning environment outside of the laboratory. Like infants, children 
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failed to learn novel information about objects that were irrelevant to the surprising event 
itself. 
Together, these results suggest that surprise enhances learning across a range of 
ages (infants and preschoolers), environments (laboratory and museum), core principles 
of object behavior (solidity, spatiotemporal continuity, support, and featural continuity), 
learning contents (arbitrary object-sound mappings, explanations, and novel words), and 
dependent measures (looking, exploration, and pointing). Thus, surprising events appear 
to present a special opportunity to learn, not only in animals (e.g., Kamin, 1969) and 
human adults (e.g., den Ouden et al., 2009), but also in young learners who have more 
limited cognitive resources. Children and even untutored preverbal infants are sensitive to 
conflict between the predicted and the observed, and use this conflict to scaffold new 
learning. 
In my experiments, I tested learning following violations of expectations drawn 
from core knowledge of object behavior – knowledge that is available from early in life, 
is universal across human cultures, and is present in other species. That violations of 
these foundational expectations – whose existence has been used to argue for the 
presence of rich innate knowledge in infants – lead to enhanced learning reveals a 
surprising harmony between early knowledge and early learning.  
It is worth noting that it could have been the case that infants and children learned 
more poorly following these core knowledge violations than following expected events. 
For example, infants could have revised their understanding of the entities in the 
surprising events, such that the entity that behaved surprisingly was no longer considered 
a bone fide object after having violated a core principle of object-hood. Evidence for this 
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type of discarding of a previous object representation comes from previous findings – 
infants who see an object being broken in to pieces fail to track the broken pieces over 
occlusion (Cheries et al., 2008; Chiang & Wynn, 2000). Similarly, adults tracking 
multiple moving objects on a screen cease to effectively track them when the objects are 
seen to implode into and explode out of existence, or dissolve out of existence and then 
coalesce back into existence (e.g., Scholl & Pylyshyn, 1999; van Marle & Scholl, 2003).  
Nonetheless, my results show that infants in this series of studies continued to 
represent an object following a violation of their expectations, such that they learned 
more effectively about it and explored it in remarkably sophisticated ways. Importantly, 
this phenomenon extends beyond infancy to older children, and is not constrained to the 
context of looking time tasks. The boost I observed in children’s learning of novel words 
occurred in a dynamic setting outside the laboratory, opening up the possibility that 
surprise may enhance learning across a variety of settings, including the classroom – a 
direction ripe for future inquiry. 
By what mechanism might surprise enhance learning? One possibility is that 
seeing a surprising event causes observers to allocate more attention to the entity that 
behaved surprisingly. Models of animal learning posit such an effect: that attention to a 
cue that failed to accurately predict an outcome is increased, thereby enhancing learning 
about that surprising stimulus (e.g., Pearce & Hall, 2008; see section 1.4). Research has 
shown that attention indeed has a strong influence on memory in human observers. For 
example, adults instructed to remember a list of words showed reduced memory 
performance when their attention was divided with another task (e.g., Craik, Govoni, 
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Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; Mulligan, 1998; see also Baddeley, Lewis, 
Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984).  
In addition to being implicated in memory, attention has also been shown to play 
a role in learning. For example, two groups of rats were exposed to identical auditory 
stimuli that varied in frequency and intensity. One group was reinforced to discriminate 
between frequencies, while the other group was reinforced to discriminate between 
intensities. Rats who attended to frequency learned to identify a frequency target but not 
an intensity target, and vice versa (Polley, Steinberg, & Merzenich, 2006; see Ahissar & 
Hochstein, 1993 for similar results with human adults). Thus, attention to the relevant 
feature improved learning of that particular feature. Attention not only enhances learning 
through reinforced conditioning, but also enhances incidental learning in humans (Turk-
Browne, Jungé, & Scholl, 2005). In one task, adult observers watched a stream of serially 
presented red and green shapes. The order of the shapes within each color category were 
statistically structured in triplets, but the colors were interleaved throughout the stream. 
Observers were told to attend to one particular color and indicate when they saw an 
immediate repetition of a shape in the attended color. At test, the observers were shown 
triplets of shapes that maintained the statistical structure, and novel triplets of shapes that 
had appeared in the stream as parts of other triplets. Across a variety of conditions, 
observers incidentally learned the statistical structure of the shapes in the attended color 
and identified statistically intact triplets, but failed to do so for the unattended color. 
These results indicate that the allocation of attention influences learning (Turk-Browne et 
al., 2005). 
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It is possible, then, that infants’ enhanced learning about (and perhaps even 
memory for) surprising objects is at least in part due to having allocated more attention to 
the target object than infants who saw the expected outcome. Although the experimental 
design ensured that infants’ looking duration to the violation and expected outcomes did 
not differ, it is unknown to what aspect of the scene they attended. Eye-tracking data 
might be particularly useful as a means to analyze finer-grained patterns of infants’ 
looking. For instance, infants who saw the expected outcome might have attended more 
to irrelevant aspects of the scene (e.g., the slope or color of the ramp). Conversely, infants 
who saw the violation outcome might have attended more to the object itself, leading to 
better learning about that object. Infants who saw the violation outcome also might have 
made more saccades between the object and critical items in the background (e.g., the 
relationship between the ball and the wall it appeared to pass through). This attention to 
the context of the violation also could have boosted infants’ attention to and memory of 
such items, like the wall. Future experiments should investigate this possibility. Critically, 
however, this potential boost in attention must be highly localized to only those objects 
that participated the violation event, as infants and children failed to learn about objects 
that were completely irrelevant to the surprising event (see Experiments 1.3 and 3.4).  
Another, related possibility for how surprise affected infants’ and children’s 
learning concerns the depth with which they processed the violation events. In particular, 
infants and children might have processed the outcomes of surprising events more deeply 
than expected events. It has previously been shown that adults who are prompted to more 
deeply process the words in a list (i.e., by answering questions about each word’s 
semantic meaning) later recall more words from the list than adults prompted to process 
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the words more shallowly (i.e., by answering questions about their phonetic features) 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975). Children show a nearly identical 
pattern of performance (Murphy & Brown, 1973; Weiss, Robinson, & Hastie, 1977; Geis 
& Hall, 1977). Thus, it is possible that infants and children in my experiments processed 
the surprising object more deeply than those who saw the object behave as expected. 
Infants who saw an object behave surprisingly might have been impelled to think about 
the object more deeply – perhaps in the process, encoding features including the object’s 
hidden property (e.g., a sound it makes; see Experiment Series 1) or the object’s verbal 
label (see Experiment Series 3). Additionally, recent evidence suggests that mind-
wandering selectively impairs deep processing in adults (Thomson, Smilek, & Besner, 
2014). As described above, it is plausible that infants who saw the expected outcome 
distributed their attention more broadly and processed more unrelated details of the scene 
(e.g., the color of the ramp) rather than deeply encoding the properties of the target object. 
If this were true, infants who saw the expected outcome should remember more features 
of irrelevant items (e.g., the ramp), whereas infants who saw the surprising outcome 
should remember more features of highly relevant items (e.g., the ball) – a testable 
prediction. 
It may also be informative to consider infants’ and children’s enhanced learning 
following surprising events from a Bayesian framework. On such a framework, infants 
and children are posited to have priors about, for example, object behavior (e.g., that 
objects are solid, cohesive entities); these priors might be set by evolution (i.e., they are 
innate) or by experience gained in the first weeks or months of life (i.e., they are 
acquired). They then observe evidence, which is weighed and then used to update priors 
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to posterior probabilities. A variety of kinds of information are relevant to this Bayesian 
process. For example, a learner can determine how expected the observation was given 
their prior hypotheses – on this view, surprise is best viewed not as a binary dimension 
(with events being either surprising or expected), but as a continuum (e.g., Téglás et al., 
2011; Tenenbaum et al., 2011; Perfors et al., 2011; Schulz, 2012). According to Bayesian 
models of surprise (e.g., Courville et al., 2006; Baldi & Itti, 2010), infants might revise 
their posteriors to a greater degree upon receiving surprising evidence. This difference 
between the initial prior and the subsequent posterior signals a change and thus 
uncertainty in the prior, therefore leading to faster or better learning (which is compatible 
with the model by Pearce & Hall, 1980). This framework is not mutually exclusive with 
the aforementioned possibilities regarding increased attention and/or deeper processing of 
surprising events. In fact, it might be the difference between infants’ priors and posteriors 
that induce a change in attention (Baldi & Itti, 2010; Itti & Baldi, 2009) or cause a change 
in the depth of processing that, in turn, enhance learning following core knowledge 
violations. 
In the present series of studies I investigated the effects of violations of core 
knowledge of object behavior on learning in infants and children. Expectancy violations 
involving other types of knowledge, and other knowledge domains, are also likely to be 
important. For example, infants and children form new expectations by tracking 
experienced contingencies (e.g., Saffran et al., 1996), by receiving others’ testimony 
(Jaswal, 2010), and by using abstract knowledge to form probabilistic predictions about 
events they have never before observed (e.g., Téglás et al., 2011). Some of these 
sophisticated behaviors have also been interpreted in terms of Bayesian inferences that 
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generate knowledge by weighing new evidence against prior beliefs (Tenenbaum, 
Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006; Schulz, 2012). These results open the door to asking how 
violations detected in different domains of prior knowledge, or using different kinds of 
new evidence, shape exploration and learning across the lifespan. 
For example, one critical question is whether violations of events outside the core 
domain of objects would enhance learning as impossible core violations do. Even young 
infants can use probabilistic information to make inferences about whether outcomes are 
likely or unlikely to occur (e.g., Téglás et al., 2011; Téglás, Girotto, Gonzalez, & Bonatti, 
2007; Xu & Garcia, 2008; Xu & Denison, 2009). Infants can also track visual and 
auditory statistical patterns and are sensitive to the degree to which those patterns are 
surprising. They prefer attending to statistical patterns that are neither too predictable nor 
too complex (the “Goldilocks effect”) (Kidd, Piantadosi, & Aslin, 2012; Kidd, Piantadosi, 
& Aslin, 2014). Counterintuitively, although I showed infants and children events that 
were designed to appear physically impossible (e.g., a ball passing through a wall), these 
events might still fall into the category of being only moderately surprising. More 
extreme violations, like a ball passing through the wall, splitting into dozens of other 
objects, changing identity, then disappearing might be far too unpredictable to attend to 
and learn about, because the outcome of this event is not even interpretable within the 
context in which the event was initially parsed. 
Future experiments can explore what kinds of events might be optimally 
surprising to support subsequent learning. In ongoing studies I am presenting children 
with events in which an object is randomly drawn from a distribution. The probability of 
that object’s retrieval at random varies, such that some events are probable (e.g., 50% 
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likelihood), some events are impossible (e.g., 0% likelihood, as in the experiments in this 
dissertation), and critically, others are merely improbable (e.g., 5% likelihood). The 
question is whether children will learn more effectively following the improbable than 
the probable event, and if so, if they would learn as effectively from the improbable as 
the impossible event. If they do, this would suggest that violations that are surprising due 
to being unlikely enhance learning, much as impossible core knowledge violations do. If 
there is a difference in learning following improbable and impossible outcomes, there 
might indeed be evidence for an optimal amount of surprise to enhance learning, as the 
Goldilocks effect (Kidd et al., 2012; 2014) might suggest.  
In summary, my experiments reveal that when young learners see an object defy 
their expectations, they learn about that object better, explore that object more, and test 
relevant hypotheses for that object’s behavior. Seen through this lens, the decades of 
findings that infants look longer at surprising events suggest not only that infants are 
equipped with core knowledge about fundamental aspects of the world, but that, from 
early in the lifespan through childhood, this knowledge is harnessed to empower new 
learning. Thus core knowledge is not an alternative to learning, but instead a key 
ingredient in driving learning forward.  
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